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A BIG MISTAKE: ERODING TIE DEFENSE
OF MISTAKE OF FACT ABOUT
CONSENT IN RAPE
ROSANNA CAVALLARO*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Thirty years ago, for the first time, the defense of mistake of fact'
emerged as a defense to a charge of rape.2 Thirty years later, the availability of that defense has been suddenly and substantially eroded. By
allowing the defense only where the evidence of consent is "equivocal," courts are establishing a standard for an instruction on mistake
that has been applied in no other context in which the mistake defense arises. 3 This new rule of equivocality imposes limits on the role
of the jury that are unique to rape, adding the defense of mistake of
fact to a growing array of procedural and substantive rules of law that
have singular application to that offense..
This Article examines the development of mistake of fact as a defense to rape from its adoption in 1964 to its virtual demise in the last
year. I argue that the emergence of a rule of equivocality culminates
from a growing judicial discomfort with the implications of an expan* Assistant Professor, Suffolk University Law School; AB., 1983, Harvard College; J.D.,
1986, Harvard Law School. Many thanks to Martin Nebrida Buchanan, Ralph and Jim
Cavallaro, Alan Dershowitz, Victoria Eiger, Linda Fentiman, George Fletcher, Ray Madoff,
Stephen McJohn, Michael Schneider, Stephen J. Schulhofer, and Carol Steiker for their
comments; toJohn Beibel and Kimberly Wittenberg Lurie for their research, and to David
Poole and Emma Bell Poole for everything else.
1 The defense of "mistake of fact" as to consent is similar to, but not precisely coextensive with, the defense of "honest and reasonable belief" as to consent. As this Article will
demonstrate, the difference in nomenclature has had a substantive impact on the scope of
the defense.
2 See People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673, 678 (Cal. 1964) (recognizing an honest and
reasonable belief that a sexual partner is over the legal age of consent as a defense to a
charge of statutory rape).
3 See People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961 (Cal. 1992); Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436 (7th Cir.
1995) (Posner, J.), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996); Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1993); Commonwealth v. Fionda, 599 N.E.2d 635 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
In 1992, as an associate of Alan M. Dershowitz, I participated in the appeal of Michael
G. Tyson's conviction for rape and drafted that portion of the brief challenging the refusal
of the trial court to instruct on the defense of mistake as to consent.
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sive defense of mistake to a charge of rape. First, I consider the adoption of the rule of equivocality, examining its flaws both on its own
terms and by considering application of that rule in other areas of
criminal law, particularly self-defense. Next I consider the impact of a
rule of equivocality on certain aspects of the role of the jury, concluding that the rule has the effect of transforming the jury function in
fundamental ways. Then I consider the relationship of the rule of
equivocality to rules that once governed rape prosecutions, in particular the requirement that the complainant's testimony be corroborated, and the admissibility of evidence regarding a complainant's
prior sexual conduct. I argue that the rule of equivocality is a revival,
albeit inverted, of legal rules that were largely repudiated by the rape
reform legislation of the last twenty years, and that the discourse surrounding these decisions is a parallel inversion of the now repudiated
discourse about women's sexuality that had accompanied those rules.
Finally, I contend that to the extent criminal law should be concerned
with improving communication about sexual behavior and consent,
the requirement that a belief as to consent be reasonable adequately
protects that interest without the costs imposed by a rule of
equivocality.
Although this Article treats certain California decisions as critical
references, the problem posed by the erosion of the defense of mistake is far broader. California was the first state in the country to recognize that a defendant who honestly and reasonably mistakes the age
of a sexual partner may seek an acquittal on a charge of statutory rape
4
on that ground. Other states promptly adopted that reasoning. Similarly, when California expanded the rule to permit the defense of mistake of fact as to actual consent where the victim is of the age to give
consent,5 other states again followed suit.6 This Article considers the
rule of equivocality announced in California as one that, like the rules
regarding mistake, is more than likely to have a similar influence nationwide. 7 It is for this reason that I discuss in detail the developSee infra note 29 and accompanying text.
5 People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975) (en banc). See infra part II.
6 Since People v. Mayberry, nine other states have recognized the defense of mistake
of fact as to consent in rape. See Reynolds v. State, 664 P.2d 621 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983);
People v. Lowe, 565 P.2d 1352 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713 (Conn.
1989); In Interest ofJ.F.F., 341 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Dizon, 390 P.2d 759
(Haw. 1964); State v. Williams, 696 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Owens v. Nevada, 620
P.2d 1236 (Nev. 1980); People v. Crispo, No. 3105-85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. October 16, 1988);
Green v. State, 611 P.2d 262 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980). See also United States v. Short, 4
C.MA. 437, 16 C.M.R. 11 (1954).
7 Already, one United States court of appeals and at least two state intermediate appellate courts have applied an analysis similar to that of the Williams court, discussed herein.
Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Indiana law), cert denied, 116 S. Ct.
4
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ments in California regarding mistake in rape law.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFENSE

MISTAKE OF FACT: A SUMMARY OF THE DEFENSE

A.

Criminal offenses, at least those traditional offenses which carry
with them serious sanctions such as imprisonment and its accompanying social stigma, are defined not only by conduct but also by a mental
element,8 variously embraced by the terms "fault,"9 "mens rea," "culpability,"' 0 "blameworthiness,"" or "intent," that must accompany the
forbidden conduct. Where an offense requires a particular mental
state, such as knowledge or purpose, an honest and reasonable belief
that precludes a defendant from forming or maintaining that mental
state will preclude conviction. Similarly, where knowledge of the
existence of a certain fact is an essential element of an offense, a mistaken belief about that fact which, if true, would make the conduct
2
innocent, also precludes criminal liability.'
Since a mistake of fact operates to negate the mental element of a
charged offense, it is not so much a defense as a means of demonstrat13
ing the failure of the prosecution's proof of that essential element.
697 (1996); Commonwealth v. Fionda, 599 N.E.2d 635 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Tyson v.
State, 619 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). See alsojohnson v. State, 419 S.E.2d 96 (Ga.
App. Ct. 1992) (holding that proof of the element of force negated any possible mistake as
to consent).
8 See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) ("The contention that
an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom
of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose
between good and evil. A relation between some mental element and punishment for a
harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory, 'But I didn't mean
to' ..

.. .

9 See, e.g., John C.JeffiiesJr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of
Proofin the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L. J. 1325, 1378-74 (1979) ("with respect to traditional
crimes, it is a widely accepted normative principle that conviction should not be had without proof of fault") (footnote omitted).
10 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 cm. 1 (1985) ("Crime does and should mean
condemnation and no court should have to pass that judgment unless it can declare that
the defendant's act was culpable. This is too fundamental to be compromised.") (footnote
omitted).
11 OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs,

THE COMMON LAw 49-50 (1881) ("a law which punished

conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average memeber of the coummunity
would be too severe for that community to bear").
12 In one familiar illustration of this principle, a person who, when leaving a restaurant,
mistakenly takes not his own umbrella but that of another will, in mostjurisdictions, not be
guilty of larceny, because that crime is defined to require that the actor have the "intent to
steal the property of another." WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusTrN W. ScoTr, JR., CimNAL LAw
§ 5.1(a), at 406 (2d ed. 1986).
13 See, e.g., Edwin . Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the CriminalLaw, 22 HAzv. L. REv.
75, 86 n.4 (1908) ("Such defenses as mistake and alibi, each of which denies one of the
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The defense of mistake of fact, it has been observed, is to that extent
superfluous, since it merely restates the axiom that the prosecution
must prove every element of an offense. 14 Nevertheless, a mistaken
belief by an actor that precludes the required mental state which
would make the conduct criminal has most often been treated as giving rise to a defense, with the initial burden of raising a reasonable
doubt placed upon the defendant, and the prosecution required to
disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.' 5
Mistake of fact is available as a defense to a particular charge only
where the definition of the offense makes a defendant's mental state
as to a particular element material. 1 6 For rape, generally defined as
sexual intercourse accomplished by force and without consent,' 7 an
elements of guilt, must not in this connection be confounded with defenses of an affirmative character under which the defendant admits the commission of the crime but claims
exemption from punishment because of some excusing fact, such as self-defense.").
14 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 62(b), at 246 (1984) ("[i]f the defendant's ignorance or mistake makes proof of a required element impossible, the prosecution
will necessarily fail in its proof of the offense"); LAFAVE & Scorr, supra, note 12, § 5.1 (a), at
406 ("[ilnstead of speaking of ignorance or mistake of fact, it would be just as easy to note
simply that the defendant cannot be convicted when it is shown that he does not have the
mental state required by law for commission of that particular offense"); GLANVILLE WiLIUAMS, CRIMINAL LAw: THE GENERAL PART 173 (2d ed. 1963) (noting that the rule "is not a
new rule; and the law could be stated equally well without reference to mistake"); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.04 cmtL 1 ("[t]o put the matter as this subsection does is not to say anything that would not otherwise be true, even if no provision on the subject were made").
15 See, e.g., LAFAVE & Sco-r, supra, note 12, § 5.1(a), at 406 ("the practice has developed
of dealing with such mistakes as a matter of defense"); ROBINSON, supra, note 14, § 62, at
244-45.
16 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1) ("Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact
or law is a defense if: (a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge,
belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense.");
Keedy, supra, note 13, at 82 ("There is no saving power in mistake itself.... It is only by
showing the absence of the criminal mind due to his mistake that he can escape punishment for his criminal act. It follows that the mistake is no defense, where there is a prosecution under a statute, in which the legislature has indicated that no criminal mind is
necessary for a conviction of the crime created by the statute.").
17 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1) (defining rape as sexual intercourse "by force
or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping"); IND.
CODE § 35-42-4-1 (1989) (defining rape as "knowingly or intentionally [having] sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex when ... the other person is compelled by
force or imminent threat of force"); IOWA CODE § 709.4(1) (1994) (defining rape as "a sex
act.., done by force or against the will of the other participant"); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:142 (West 1989) ("[a]n actor is guilty of aggravated sexual assault if he commits an act of
sexual penetration with another person [and] . . . the actor uses physical force or
coercion").
According to Blackstone, the common law defined rape as "the carnal knowledge of a
woman forcibly and against her will." 4 WILLIAM BLACSTONE, COMMENTARIES *209, cited in
Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Dfference Between the Presence ofForce and the
Absence of Consent 92 COLO. L. REv. 1780 n.1 (1992). Dripps notes that "[t]echnically, rape
was not a common-law crime after the Statutes of Westminster in the reign of Edward I,"
and that the second of these statutes, adopted in 1285, "made it a felony for a man to
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actor must have a level of intent that is at least reckless and, more
often, either purposeful or knowing. While states uniformly require
that this mental state accompany the sexual conduct itself and the
force, there is no similar consensus as to whether it must also accompany the element of non-consent. Some states require that a defendant be aware that a complainant does not consent in order to be guilty
of rape,' 8 while in other states the offense is complete if the complainant does not consent and the defendant knows only that he19 is engaging in the sexual conduct through force. 20 Still other states have
simply not resolved the question. This ambiguity gives rise to much of
the conflicting decisional law attempting to apply mistake of fact to
rape, for if a defendant need not be aware of a complainant's nonconsent, then a mistaken belief that she is consenting will not relieve
him of criminal culpability. Logically, a definition of the requisite
mens rea, if any, as to non-consent in rape should precede any determination of the availability of mistake of fact as a defense. However,
the history of the defense is that courts have not always applied this
logical sequence.
B.

PfEOPLE V. HERAANDEZ AND THE ROOTS OF MISTAKE IN RAPE

Mistake of fact as a defense to a charge of rape has its origins not
in adult rape, but rather in the derivative context of statutory rape.
Curiously, the first approach to a mistake of fact defense to rape occurred in a California case where the defendant was mistaken not as
to the complainant's actual consent, but as to her age. This development is noteworthy since nationally there had been a long and unbroken tradition of strict liability as to sexual conduct with minors. 2 '
'ravish' a woman without her 'assent.'" Dripps concludes that "the common-law definition
of rape is a gloss on the statute." Id.
18 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

19 Although I recognize that both men and women have been victims of rape, for simplicity and clarity, I refer to defendants as male and to complainants as female throughout
this Article. I also use the term "complainant" rather than "victim," since the latter term is
an implicit resolution of issues that are the subject of dispute in the cases cited in this
Article.
20 See, e.g., State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291 (Me. 1984); Commonwealth v. Williams, 439
A.2d 765 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); State v. Houghton, 272 N.W.2d 788 (S.D. 1978). This
approach is sensible in that a defendant has the capacity to know that he is using force, but
lacks the capacity to know a victim's state of mind regarding consent except through her
external manifestations of it.
21 Indeed, as to a number of other offenses, the majority of American states, including
California, continue to treat the age of the victim as a strict liability element. These offenses can be grouped into two general categories. In the first are those offenses which
would be offenses regardless of the age of the victim (such as distribution of narcotics), so
that the victim's status as a minor merely aggravates already culpable conduct. See, e.g.,
People v. Lopez, 77 Cal. Rptr. 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (mistake of age no defense to charge
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In People v. Hernandez, the California Supreme Court reversed its
prior rule of strict liability and required the trial court to admit defense evidence tending to show that the defendant had a good faith,
22
reasonable belief that the complainant was over eighteen years old.
Essential to the court's decision was the proposition that in statutory
rape the age of the complainant serves as a proxy for the element of
consent; this proposition is based on the theory that a minor is legally
incapable of giving valid consent.2 3 As the court explained:
We are dealing here, of course, with statutory rape where, in one sense,
the lack of consent of the female is not an element of the offense. In a
broader sense, however, the lack of consent is deemed to remain an element but the law makes a conclusive presumption of the lack thereof
of furnishing marijuana to a minor). The second category involves offenses in which the

threshold age of the victim is so low that an honest belief that the victim was somewhat
older is deemed insufficient to alter the character of the actor's conduct. See, e.g., People v.
Olsen, 685 P.2d 52, 57 (Cal. 1984) (mistake of age no defense to charge of committing
lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under age 14).
22 People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964). This rule had been firmly established in People v. Ratz, 46 P. 915 (Cal. 1896). The Ratz court held that the "object and
purpose of the law [forbidding sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 14] are too
plain to need comment, the crime too infamous to bear discussion," and that the "protection of society, of the family, and of the infant, demand that one who has carnal intercourse under such circumstances shall do so in peril of the fact, and he will not be heard
against the evidence to urge his belief that the victim of his outrage had passed the period
which would make his act a crime." Id. at 916. See also People v. Griffin, 49 P. 711 (Cal.
1897) (defendant's lack of awareness of complainant's mental condition, which made her
unable to give legal consent, no defense to rape).
At the time of those decisions, however, the age of consent was 14 years; at the time of
the Hernandez decision, it was 18. As the age of consent is raised, the articulated legislative
purpose of prohibiting sexual contact with minors diminishes, and the justification for
recognizing the defense of mistake correspondingly increases. See Larry W. Myers, Reasonable Mistake of Age: A Needed Defense to Statutory Rape, 64 MIcH. L. R.Ev. 105 (1964). See also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 (forbidding the defense of mistake as to age whenever "the
criminality of conduct depends upon a child's being below the age of 10" but permitting
the defense whenever criminality depends on the child's being below a critical age above
10).
23 At the time of the Hernandez decision, California defined statutory rape in the same
section as the offense of forcible rape, with the victim's age and force as alternative elements which, together with defined sexual conduct, gave rise to criminal culpability. Section 261 of the California Penal Code provided:
Rape is an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with a female not the wife of
the perpetrator, under either of the following circumstances:
1. Where the female is under the age of 18 years;
2. Where she resists, but her resistance is overcome by force or violence;
3. Where she is prevented from resisting by threats of great and immediate bodily
harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution; ....
See People v. Collins, 351 P.2d 326, 327 n.1 (Cal. 1960) (superceeded by statute as stated in
People v. Bradford, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 444 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)). Applying the old version of
§ 261, the court in Collins noted that subdivisions of § 261 "do not state different offenses
but merely define the different circumstances under which an act of intercourse constitutes the crime of rape." Collins, 351 P.2d at 328.
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because she is presumed too innocent and naive to understand the implications and nature of her act.2 4

The court then considered the significance of a defendant's good
faith, reasonable belief that the complainant was over the age of consent. Relying on section 20 of the California Penal Code,2 the court
recited the fundamental principle of criminal law "that it is not conduct alone, but conduct accompanied by certain specific mental states
which concerns, or should concern, the law." 26 After considering the
application of this principle in a 1956 decision in which a defendant's
good faith, reasonable, but mistaken, belief that a first marriage had
been terminated by divorce was held to be a valid defense to a charge
of bigamy arising out of defendant's second marriage, 27 the court concluded, "[c] ertainly it cannot be a greater wrong to entertain a bona
fide but erroneous belief that a valid consent to an act of sexual intercourse has been obtained." 28 On this basis, the court found that a
good faith, reasonable belief that the victim was indeed over the age
24 Hernandez, 393 P.2d at 674. The notes to the Penal Code of 1872 explained the
conclusiveness of the statute's presumption of non-consent: "[t ] his provision embodies the
well settled rule of the existing law;, that a girl under ten years of age is incapable of giving
any consent to an act of intercourse which can reduce it below the grade of rape." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 261 comment (1st ed. 1872), quoted in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 601 P.2d 572, 579 (Cal. 1979) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (examining legislative
history of statutory rape), aff', 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
25 That section codifies the principle of mens rea set forth above, see, e.g., supranotes 912 and accompanying text providing that ("[i]n every crime or public offense there must
exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence.") CAL. PENAL
CODE § 20, cited in Hernandez, 395 P.2d at 674..
The defendant in Hernandezalso relied upon CAL. PENAL CODE § 26, see Hernandez,393P.2d at 674, which provides, in part:
All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes:

Three - Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged under an
ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent.
Although neither section refers to good faith belief, and indeed, § 26 refers instead to
"mistake of fact," the court's analysis is framed in terms of defendant's "honest and reasonable belief" rather than his "mistake." Id. at 677 (citing Ex Parte Ahar4 159 P. 160, 161-62
(Cal. 1916) (quoting Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 168 (1889))). ("At common law an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances, which, if true, would make the
act for which the person is indicted an innocent act, has always been held to be a good
defense."). The reasonable belief is deemed to go "to the culpability of the young man
who acts without knowledge," relieving him of criminal responsibility not because the belief was erroneous, but instead because it was actually and reasonably held. Id. at 675.
As is demonstrated more fully, infta, in cases following from Hernandez and culminating in Wdliams, judicial analysis of this issue has gradually shifted emphasis away from the
good faith of a defendant's belief and toward mistake, with increasing significance imputed to this difference in diction. See infra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
26 Hernande, 393 P.2d at 675.
27 People v. Vogel, 299 P.2d 850 (Cal. 1956).
28 People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673, 677 (Cal. 1964).
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of consent was a valid defense to what previously had been a crime of
strict liability.29

The novelty of the Hernandez decision lies in its smooth elision of
the correlation between age and actual consent, and in its automatic
and unreflective application of principles of mens rea to an element-age-that might as easily have been treated as one requiring
no proof of intent.3 0 The court assumed, without discussion, that
29 The court explained that "the reluctance to accord to a charge of statutory rape the
defense of lack of criminal intent has no greater justification than in the case of other
statutory crimes, where the Legislature has made identical provision with respect to intent." Id at 677. This observation begs the critical question of what intent, if any, is required as to the element of age. The legislative language offers no answer whatever, which
may make it "identical" to that of other statutes, but which is no greater a source of insight
for this identity. Moreover, the defense of lack of criminal intent was always, at least theoretically, available for the offense of statutory rape, so long as the intent at issue was the
intent to engage in the sexual conduct. The narrower and harder question was the consequence of a lack of criminal intent as to a different element, the victim's age.
In the immediate aftermath of Hernandez, at least two states amended their criminal
codes, adopting the Henandez rule as law. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-4(c) (SmithHurd 1978) (repealed 1984) (providing that it is an affirmative defense that a defendant
.reasonably believed that the child was of the age of 16 or upward at the time of the
offense"); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-3 (Michie 1963) (repealed 1979) (same). The Model
Penal Code also permits a defense of reasonable mistake as to age, so long as the relevant
age is over ten. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(1).
In succeeding years, several more states added the defense of mistake as to age, either
through broad revisions of their criminal codes adopting the Model Penal Code in some
form, or through specific legislative enactment See, e.g., IND. CODE § 3 5-42-4-3(c) (Bums
1995) ("It is a defense [to the offense of performing sexual intercourse or criminal deviate
conduct with a child under fourteen years of age] that the person reasonably believed that
the child was sixteen (16) years of age or older at the time of the conduct").
Still, other states adopted the rule and reasoning of Hernandez through judicial decision, see, e.g., State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978); Powe v. State, 389 N.W.2d 215
(Minn. Ct App. 1986); State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727 (Utah 1984), bringing the total number
of states that permit the defense to seven.
Of those states that do not permit the defense, nearly all have rejected post-Hernandez
challenges on the ground that, notwithstanding general principles of mens rea, age is not
and has never been an element of the offense of statutory rape as to which intent need be
proven, the very question that the California court evaded. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 253
A.2d 579, 580 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969) ("it has been the universally accepted view of
the courts of this country that defendant's knowledge of the age of the woman is not an
essential element of the crime of statutory rape and that, therefore, 'it was no defense that
the accused reasonably believed her to be of the age of consent'") (citations omitted);
State v. Stiffler, 788 P.2d 220, 222 (Idaho 1990); State v. Stokely, 842 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Mo.
1992).
30 The many states that continue to bar a defense of mistake of fact as to age for statutory rape, as well as those states that do not recognize a defense of mistake of fact as to
actual consent to rape, have done so on this basis. See supranote 29 (statutory rape). See,
e.g., People v. Witte, 449 N.E.2d 966, 971 n.2 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) ("the only intent necessary
to support rape is the general intent to perform the physical act; 'whether the defendant
intended to commit the offense[s] without the victim's consent is not relevant'") (alteration in the original) (citation omitted); People v. Christensen, 414 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Iowa
Ct App. 1987) ("a defendant's awareness of a putative sexual abuse victim's lack of consent
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whatever might be said about an adult complainant's consent would
be equally true of a minor complainant's age. Although the Hernandez
court did hold that the complainant's age created a conclusive presumption about her actual consent, and the statute at the time did
offer age and force as alternative circumstances creating liability for
sexual intercourse, 3 1 neither circumstance compels the conclusion
that these elements are equivalent with respect to the requisite intent.
Yet the decision relies upon this equivalency, reasoning from bigamy
to "valid consent to an act of sexual intercourse," and from there to
statutory rape, without confronting the relationship between age and
consent on the one hand, and intent on the other.
Still stranger, although the Hernandez decision is predicated upon
an assumption that intent must be proven as to consent in adult rape,
is that that assumption was not adopted as law either in California or
elsewhere in the United States for over ten years after Hernandez was
decided, and to date has not been adopted in a majority of American
jurisdictions. Since the California court held that mistake as to age
was a defense to statutory rape only because age acted as a proxy for
actual consent, it would appear that the court should, afortiori, have
permitted mistake as to actual consent to operate as a valid defense to
adult rape. 32 Yet, it was not until 1975, over ten years later, that any
court adopted the rule implicit in Hernandez as a settled principle of
33
law.

is not an element of third-degree sexual abuse"); Commonwealth v. Lefkowitz, 481 N.E.2d
227, 231 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) ("the prosecution has proved rape if the jury concludes that
the intercourse was in fact nonconsensual .. ., without any special emphasis on the defendant's state of mind"). See also LFAw & ScoTr, supranote 12, § 5.1, at 408 ("[t]he crime of
rape must be understood as not including an element of knowledge of the woman's lack of
consent, from which it follows that not every mistake by the defendant by which he believes
the woman is consenting will be a defense").
31 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
32 At least one commentator, however, has argued that the mens rea for statutory rape
is clearer than that for adult rape. Compare GEORGE P. FTCHER, RETHINKING CRiMiNtA.
LAw § 9.2.2, at 698-707 (1978); and § 9.3, at 728 n.53 (arguing that "the factor of age is
necessary to state the minimal set of incriminating criteria" for the offense of statutory.
rape) id.
33 See People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975) (en banc). There are a very few
jurisdictions that have preserved the doctrinal anomaly of that ten year period, permitting
a defense of mistake as to age in statutory rape while refusing to recognize a defense of
mistake of fact as to actual consent. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-42-4-3(c) (mistake as to age);
Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d at 294 n.19 (noting in dictum that "a credible argument can be
made that the [defendant's] tendered instructions [on mistake of fact about consent] do
not correctly state the law in Indiana because they incorrectly focus on [defendant's] perception of [the complainant's] consent."). See a/sOMODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(1) (mistake
as to age with respect to sexual offense).
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THE M4MYBWRY STANDARD AND THE EVIDENTIARY PREDICATE FOR AN
INSTRUCTION ON MISTAKE

In People v. Mayberry,3 4 defendant Franklin Mayberry was charged
with kidnapping, rape, and oral copulation based upon testimony by
the complainant diametrically opposed to his own. Where the complainant described a barrage of threats and blows that so overwhelmed her as to make it impossible for her to seek help, the
defendant described mutuality and consent. This evidentiary chasm
nevertheless formed the basis for a new rule recognizing the mistake
defense to rape. This new rule would later be transformed by decisions which emphasized aspects of the complainant's conduct that
could be described as "equivocal," in order to redefine the quality of
the evidentiary predicate that would support a mistake instruction.
To convey the depth of this transformation, it is necessary to detail the facts of Mayberry. The complainant, identified as Miss B., testified that she was walking past a liquor store one afternoon when the
defendant, whom she had never seen before, grabbed her by the
arm. 35 She dug her fingernails into his wrist and he released her. He
kicked her, threw a bottle, which struck her, and shouted obscenities
at her. She walked to a nearby grocery, saw no one who was near
enough for her to gain their attention, and then accompanied the
defendant outside the store "[b] ecause of her own confusion and fear
of [him]." She remained with him for some twenty minutes.3 6
"In a threatening manner" the defendant mentioned having sex.
When Miss B. refused, he again struck her, this time with his fist,
knocking her down. 37 He spoke obscenities, and threatened to
"knock every tooth out of [her] mouth." Then he seized her wrist and
said, "come on." 38 Miss B. testified that in an effort to "buy time," she
asked to purchase some cigarettes, and Mayberry agreed, taking her
by the elbow and accompanying her to a store where she purchased
cigarettes for herself and for him without mentioning her situation to
the clerk.3 9 She explained her behavior in the store by testifying that
that she felt "completely beaten," and did not think the clerk would
40
help her.
Once outside, Miss B. sat on a curb and attempted to engage Mayberry in conversation. She testified that she "put on an act" and tried
34 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975) (en banc).
35 Id. at 1340.
36 Id.
37 Id.

38 Id.
39 Id.

40 Id. at 1340-41.
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"to fool" Mayberry, thinking she might thereby escape. 4 1 Eventually,
he said "we are leaving," seized her elbow, and started to guide her.4 2
They walked several blocks to his apartment, where he barricaded the
door. Mayberry then engaged in several acts of sexual intercourse
and oral copulation with her. During the sexual attack, Mayberry
again struck her.43 While Miss B. was in the apartment, Mayberry's
brother entered, dragged her to a mattress, threw her against a wall,
and struck her face with his fists. When Mayberry stepped between his
brother and Miss B., she broke free and left.44
Mayberry's testimony was entirely different.4 5 He stated that he
and Miss B. met and engaged in conversation, that he accompanied
her both to the grocery store and to the store where she purchased
cigarettes, and that they then walked to his home. He testified that he
did not threaten her and that she did not protest, but instead accompanied him willingly and agreed to engage in intercourse. He denied
seeing his brother hit Miss B., testifying instead that his brother
laughed when he entered the apartment and upon noticing him, Miss
46
B. looked upset, said "I'll fix you," and left.
The defendant contended that he genuinely and reasonably believed that the victim had consented to return with him to his apartment to engage in sexual intercourse, and sought an instruction on
the defense of mistake of fact as to consent, which was denied by the
trial court. On appeal, the California Supreme Court analyzed the
issue according to the same sequence it had applied ten years earlier
in Hernand7,citing the provisions of sections 20 and 26 of the Penal
Code, 47 and citing the bigamy case, People v. Vogel, that had formed a
part of the Hernandez court's reasoning. 48 Similar to Hernandez, however, the court omitted to make a specific determination that intent
was required as to the element of consent.49 Instead, it noted that "there
41 To explain why she did not flee, Miss B. testified that because of an arthritic condition, her leg was stiff and she could not run fast. Id. at 1341.
42 Id
43 Id.

44 Id. Miss B.'s testimony was corroborated in part by that of a police officer, who testified that he responded to her address and observed "much bruising and swelling on her
face, left arm and leg," and by two other witnesses who testified to the bruises. Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.

47 See supra note 25; People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964).
48 People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1344-45 (Cal. 1975).

49 The court rejected the contention that recognition of a defense of mistake as to
consent would promote greater resistance by a victim in her efforts to assure that there
could be no misunderstanding as to her non-consent, and that such resistance could result
in injury to the victim, holding that "[s]uch an argument, in our view, invokes a policy
consideration for the Legislature." Id. at 1346. It further held that adoption of such a
position "would result in effective nullification of Penal Code sections 20 and 26 when
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is no rape if a female of sufficient capacity consents to sexual intercourse," 5 0 and then considered intent as to the offense as a whole,
concluding:
Although Hernandez dealt solely with statutory rape, its rationale applies
equally5 to rape by means of force or threat and kidnapping. Those
statutory provisions, like that involved in Hernandez, neither expressly
nor by necessary implication negate the continuing requirement that
there be a union of act and wrongful intent. The severe penalties imposed for those offenses and the serious loss of reputation following conviction make it extremely unlikely that the legislature intended to
exclude as to those offenses the element of wrongful intent. If a defendant entertains a reasonable and bona fide belief that a prosecutrix voluntarily consented to accompany him and to engage in sexual intercourse,
it is apparent he does not possess the wrongful intent that is a prerequisite under Penal Code section 20 to a conviction of either kidnapping or
52
rape by means of force or threat.

Having announced that the defense was, as a matter of law, available to a charge of rape, 53 the court then addressed the quality of
applied to cases of kidnaping and rape." Id. (statutory citations omitted). Again, this holding fails to recognize that there can be a meaningful requirement of "jointoperation of act
and intent" in rape without necessarily applying an intent requirement to the element of
consent. For example, the offense could be defined as sexual intercourse (purposefully or
knowingly engaged in) with a person by force (applied purposefully or knowingly), and
without consent (no inquiry into actor's state of mind as to this element).
The prosecution's prediction regarding the relationship of mistake and resistance has,
in the view of at least one commentator, come to pass. See Dana Berliner, Note, Rethinking
the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape 100 YALE L.J. 2687, 2695-2700 (1991).
50 Maybeny 542 P.2d at 1344 (citing People v. Nash, 67 Cal. Rptr. 621, 625 (Cal. C.
App.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 944 (1968), and 1 B. E. WrrImN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES §§ 173, 288

(1963)). The court made a parallel observation regarding the charge of kidnaping, noting
that "[t ] here is, of course, no kidnaping 'when one .... with knowledge of what is taking
place ....
original).

voluntarily ...

consents to accompany another.

. ."

Id. at 1344 (ellipses in

There is no mention of either consent or non-consent in California's statutory definition of rape. See supra note 25.
51 Actually, according to the reasoning of Hernandez, it applies afortiori to adult rape.
52 Mayberry, 542 P.2d at 1345 (statutory citations omitted). Again, the court answered
the wrong question. It is not whether the legislature meant to exclude the element of
wrongful intent as to the offense as a whole, but as to one element only: consent. Requiring intent as to the use of force alone, for example, could be sufficient to impose punishment consistent with § 20. So, if a defendant knowingly used force, notwithstanding any
genuinely held belief as to the victim's state of mind, he might still be guilty of rape. Many
jurisdictions have held as much. See supra note 20.
53 In addition to announcing the availability of a mistake of fact defense to a charge of
forcible rape, the Maybery court underscored the right of a criminal defendant "to have
the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence," and reaffirmed that
failure to instruct on a matter as to which there is evidence deserving of consideration
amounts to a miscarriage of justice requiring reversal. Mayberny, 542 P.2d at 1347 (citing
People v. Modesto, 382 P.2d 33, 38 (Cal. 1963), overruled by People v. Sedeno, 518 P.2d 913

(Cal. 1974), overruled on other grounds by People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979)). This
corollary holding in Maybeny becomes more significant when examining the application of
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evidence that would support such an instruction, rejecting the prosecution's contention that the facts of this case did not warrant the instruction. The court held that "[defendant's] testimony summarized
above could be viewed as indicating that he reasonably and in good
faith believed that Miss B. consented to accompany him to the apartment and to the subsequent sexual intercourse." 5 4 The mistake instruction, then, could be supported by the same evidence that
supported Mayberry's defense of actual consent, namely a defendant's
unequivocal denial of any use of force together with his unambiguous
description of consensual conduct. Indeed, nothing in the decision
suggests that this overlap was in any way odd or problematic.
But the court went further, observing that "[i]n addition, part of
Miss B's testimony furnishes support for the requested instructions. It
appears from her testimony that her behavior was equivocal." 55 The
"part" to which the court referred was that which described her putting "on an act," as well as her "admitted failure physically to resist
him after the initial encounter or to attempt to escape or obtain
help," behavior that the court concluded "might have misled [Mayberry] as to whether she was consenting." 5 6 The court said nothing
about the remainder of her testimony-including the kick, the bottle,
the threat to knock all her teeth out, and the punch that dropped her
to the ground-which was unequivocal and which, if credited, would
presumably belie any belief by the defendant about Miss B.'s consent.
The phrase "[i]n addition," which prefaces the court's discussion
of the complainant's "equivocal" conduct, is itself of uncertain weight.
According to one reading, it established a requirement that, in addition to a defendant's testimony (or other testimony supporting an actual consent defense), evidence of equivocal conduct must be
presented. This reading has given impetus to those courts eager to
narrow the defense of mistake as to consent. A better reading, both
grammatically and logically, construes the phrase "in addition" as a
transition from the holding to the discussion of equivocality, not establishing "equivocal evidence" as an essential prerequisite for a mistake
instruction, but marshalling other record evidence that augmented
the defendant's testimony and underscored the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the instruction at issue. As is argued below, the latter reading is the only one which comports with generally applicable
principles of criminal law and procedure.
In the twenty year period between Mayberry and Williams, the Calithe Mayberry defense in subsequent cases.
54 Maybery, 542 -P.2d at 1346.
55 Id.
56 I&
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fornia Supreme Court case establishing the rule of equivocality in defense of mistake cases, courts nationwide have considered challenges
to rape convictions that relied, with mixed success, upon the reasoning in Mayberiy.5 7 Some states embraced the Mayberry rule and required that their trial courts instruct on mistake as to consent or
reasonable belief in consent in rape cases. 5 8 Others declined, reaffirming a definition of rape that made some mental states relevantthose relating to the conduct element of the offense or to the use of
force-and others irrelevant, such as that relating to consent. 59
Within California, the Mayberry defense was frequently raised, 60 and
while its availability against a charge of rape remained a settled principle of law, the evidentiary contexts in which it could be employed
varied among districts of the lower appellate court.
Six years elapsed before California's intermediate appellate
courts attempted to articulate general principles regarding the evidentiary predicate for a Mayberry instruction. At one pole, an appellate
court held that trial courts must, sua sponte,6 1 instruct on reasonable
57 Additional ammunition for defense arguments as to the mistake defense in rape was
provided by the decision of the British House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v.
Morgan, 2 All E.R. 347 (H.L. 1975). In that case, the defendants testified that they had
been assured by the husband of the complainant that she wished to have sexual inter-

course with them, but that she would put up a struggle because she was "kinky." Id. at 355.
The British court reasoned that a wrongful intent was an essential element of the offense
of rape, and that not only a reasonable belief but indeed any honestly held belief as to
consent which precluded a defendant from maintaining that wrongful intent would bar a
conviction. Id. at 361. No American court has adopted a rule of this breadth.
58 See supra note 6.
59 See supra note 20.
60 Mayberry has been cited more than 100 times in California appellate decisions, and
may safely be presumed to have been raised at trial far more often than that. Search of
WESTIAW, CA-CS database (Feb. 25, 1996).
61 The issue of when a court must, sua sponte, instruct on an issue, in the absence of a
defense request for such an instruction, is ordinarily resolved upon an evidentiary threshold that is slightly different and somewhat higher than that for a requested instruction. A
number of post-Mayberry cases discussing the quality of the factual record that can support
a mistake instruction arise in this posture, and confuse the analysis of the fundamental
issue of entitlement to a Mayberiy instruction and presentation of a mistake theory to ajury.
In California, as in many states, a trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on a defense
wherever "it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the
defendant's theory of the case." People v. Sedeno, 518 P.2d 913, 921 (Cal. 1974), overnuled
on othergrounds by People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979). "Substantial" evidence in this
context has been defined as evidence sufficient to "deserve consideration by the jury."
People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1979). Compare People v. Modesto, 382 P.2d 33, 37
(Cal. 1963) (standard for a requested instruction) ("However incredible the testimony of a
defendant may be he is entitled to an instruction based upon the hypothesis that it is
entirely true"; "The fact that the evidence may not be of a character to inspire belief does
not authorize the refusal of an instruction based thereon"), overruled by People v. Sedeno,
518 P.2d 913 (Cal. 1974), overruled on other grounds by People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1 (Cal.
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belief as to consent whenever consent was offered as a defense. 62 According to that court's reading, "Maybery compel[led] the conclusion
that, by itself, the testimony of a defendant in a rape case that the
prosecutrix consented can be sufficient to require the giving of the
reasonable belief instruction."6 3 The court explained:
the reasonable belief in consent defense is not inconsistent with the defense of actual consent; to the contrary, the defendant who relies on the
defense of consent necessarily also relies on the defense6 4that he had a
reasonable and good faith belief that there was consent.
A different division of the same court, presaging Williams, occupied the other pole. It held that a Maybeny instruction was not only
not to be given whenever the defendant's theory was one of actual
consent, but was to be given only in those cases in which a defendant
produced "some evidence of equivocal conduct by the victim which
led him to reasonably believe that there was consent where in fact
there was none."6 5 This language, which required evidence that the
"manner in which the victim expressed her lack of consent [be] so
equivocal as to cause the accused to assume that she consented where
1979); Flanne 603 P.2d at 10 ("'any evidence deserving of any considerationwhatevey") ("The
fact that the evidence may not be of a character to inspire belief does not authorize the
refusal of an instruction based thereon. That is a question within the exclusive province of
thejury.") (citations omitted) with Flanne, 603 P.2d at 7-8 (standard for an instruction sua
sponte).
The second part of the above test for a sua sponte instruction requires a court to consider the instruction in the context of other defenses offered by the defendant, including a
defense of actual consent. As a result of this part of the test, courts have considered the
congruence of the defenses of mistake of fact and actual consent as a prerequisite for
giving the instruction sua sponte. See People v. May, 261 Cal. Rptr. 502, 505 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) (defenses are "compatible" but not "inseparable"), review denied, No. S012192, 1989
Cal. LEXIS 4812 (Cal. Nov. 15, 1989); People v. Romero, 215 Cal. Rptr. 634, 638 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985).
Several circuits of the United States Court of Appeals have recognized that the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a criminal defendant the right to have the jury
instructed on any and all defenses that are supported by some evidence, even those that
are inconsistent with other defense theories. See Whipple v. Duckworth, 957 F.2d 418, 423
(7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 876 (1992), and overruled by Eaglin v. Welborn, 57 F.3d 496
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 421 (1995); Strauss v. United States, 376 F.2d 416, 419 (5th
Cir. 1967). This rule of constitutional force suggests that the limitation, set out above,
requiring consistency among defenses may be flawed.
62 People v. Hampton, 173 Cal. Rptr. 268, 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
63 Id

64 Id. Note that the court makes no reference to the erroneous nature of the defendant's belief.
65 People v. Romero, 215 Cal. Rptr. 634, 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) ("while we agree that
the defense of consent and the Mayberny defense are compatible and often will be raised
together, we cannot agree with the holding in Hampton that the two defenses are inseparable nor do we feel that the raising of consent necessarily compels a sua sponte instruction
on the Mayberry defense"). Id. at 636. See also People v. May, 261 Cal. Rptr. 502, 505-06
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (same).
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in fact she did not," was ostensibly rooted in Mayberry itself, and provided an outline for the California Supreme Court's decision in
Williams.
Attempting to moderate between these extremes, a third appellate court held that evidence regarding consent did not automatically
compel an instruction on mistake as to consent, but instead gave rise
to an inference that the defendant believed the complainant consented. 6 6 This inference, the court held, would generally provide a
sufficient basis for a Maybeny instruction, unless evidence suggested
that the inference was "not deserving of any consideration
whatever. "67
In 1991, this last court again considered the issue, holding that
no prior decision had gotten it exactly right.68 In People v. Vasquez, the

court refused to give the mistake instruction automatically in every
consent case, but also agreed with earlier decisions that "equivocal
conduct is not the sine qua non for determining whether the evidence
supports a sua sponte Maybeny instruction." 6 9 Oddly, the court acknowledged that a defendant's testimony alone could trigger the duty
to instruct sua sponte on mistake as to consent, but only if that testimony was not contradicted by the complainant. Where there is a conflict in testimony, the court held:
[U] nless the evidence reveals some way to harmonize the conflicting accounts of defendant and prosecutrix through a mistake of fact, so that
the jury can evaluate proof relating to defendant's belief in consent (as
distinguished from his mere assertion of consent),70 the court need not
give the reasonable belief instruction sua sponte.
People v. Burnham, 222 Cal. Rptr. 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 639. The inference approach is tempting for its apparently successful qualification of a rigid rule, but is less persuasive when examined closely. The Burnham court explained that "[t] he inference of belief in consent may not be deserving of consideration by
the jury if, for example, the defendant clearly admits that although the victim said she
consented he did not believe her, or otherwise concedes the issue." Id. at 639 n. 11. But
this example is incoherent, since such a concession by a defendant would not even amount
to evidence of actual consent, let alone give rise to the inference described by the court.
Indeed, it is not only difficult but impossible to postulate a factual context in which there is
evidence of consent, giving rise to an inference that the defendant believed the complainant
consented, and yet the inference is "not deserving of any consideration whatever." Instead,
the inference arises and is deserving of thejury's consideration in every case in which there
is evidence of actual consent. Accordingly, the Burnham court's approach dovetails with
that of the court in Hampton.
68 People v. Vasquez, 281 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. Ct. App.), review granted, 815 P.2d 303
(Cal. 1991), review dismissed,No. S021871, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 736 (Cal. Feb. 11, 1993).
69 Id. at 670.
70 Id. at 670-71 (quoting People v. Rhoades, 238 Cal. Rptr. 909, 914 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987)).
This rule is even more confused than the absolute approaches of Hampton and Romero.
It recognizes that a defendant's testimony as to consent can support a mistake instruction,
66
67
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Each of these intermediate courts of appeal sought to integrate
the defenses of actual consent and reasonable belief as to consent.
Notably, those courts that viewed evidence of actual consent as coextensive with evidence supporting a defense of mistake as to consent
tended to use the language of "reasonable belief," placing no special
emphasis upon the erroneous nature of the belief, but instead emphasizing its authenticity and reasonableness. 7 1 Conversely, those courts
that described an evidentiary chasm between the defense, of actual
consent and that of mistake as to consent more often used the language of mistake rather than belief, notwithstanding that neither the
Hernandez nor the Mayberry court itself relied upon the "mistaken" nature of a defendant's belief for their conclusions. 72 The success of a
so-called "mistake" defense to criminal culpability follows not from
the fact that the defendant was wrong, but that his belief was genuine
and reasonable, and thereby precluded his having a punishable state
of mind. Yet the stress placed upon the error of a defendant's belief
as to consent in rape provided a foundation upon which these courts
constructed the further misconception of a need for evidence of
"equivocal" conduct. The requirement that a defendant acknowledge
the error of his belief-not merely that he honestly believed, but that
he understood his belief to be wrong-is tantamount to a denial of
the defense where the defendant's testimony is entirely consistent
with a defense of actual consent.73 This disparity between the discourse of belief and mistake reaches its apex in People v. Williams,74
together with the codification of a firm rule of equivocality. 75
then denies that instruction as a matter of law in those instances where other evidence
conflicts with that of the defendant. But as long as a defendant's testimony supports his
belief in consent, no matter what other evidence is in the record, the instruction should be
given. It is never the function of the trial court to weigh evidence, or to resolve inconsistencies within a record. As is set out infra, this approach leads to a corruption of the
respective functions of judge and jury.
71 See, e.g., People v. Hampton, 173 Cal. Rptr. 268, 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
72 See People v. Romero, 215 Cal. Rptr. 634, 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1344-45 (Cal. 1975); People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673, 676 (Cal.
1964).
73 The error of a defendant's belief is rarely proven through the defendant's own testimony. More often, the error will be demonstrated through other evidence, such as the
testimony of the complainant. For this reason as well, this emphasis on defendant's acknowledgement of error is unsound.
74 841 P.2d 961 (Cal. 1992).
75 The emphasis on error furthers the gradual transformation of the "defense" of mistake of fact from a particular method of disproving an element of the prosecution's case,
see supranotes 13-15 and accompanying text, to a true affirmative defense. See also Tyson v.
Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 447 (7th Cir. 1995 (characterizing mistake as "a true defense, unlike
the 'defense' of actual consent to intercourse") (citing IND. CODE § 35-41-3-7 and cases),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 697 (1996). By compelling a defendant to admit the error of his
belief, this rule requires a defendant to concede lack of actual consent in order to proffer a
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PEOPLE V WILLIAMSAND THE RuLE OF EQUIVOCAITy

Resolving the conflicting rules adopted by the various lower appellate courts, the California Supreme Court announced a new rule
regarding the availability of the defense of mistake as to consent in
People v. Williams. It held the defense unavailable as a matter of law
unless there is "substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that would
have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe consent
76
existed where it did not."
The complainant in this case, Deborah S., had arrived in San
Francisco two weeks prior to the events giving rise to the prosecution,
and was staying with her sister in a homeless shelter in the city. As
Deborah waited outside the shelter on the morning of the incident,
the defendant, Wash Williams, an employee, volunteer, and resident
at the shelter, asked her if she would like to get some coffee. Both
witnesses agree that they then spent the morning walking, conversing,
and eating. 77 At some point, Williams asked her if she would like to
watch television, and she testified that she "thought they were going to
'his friends or something."' 78 She accompanied him to a building
with a gate across the front, and after Williams rang a buzzer, they
were admitted. 79 Inside, "Williams rented a room, and asked the clerk
for a sheet." Deborah testified that at this point she realized they were
80
in a hotel.
Deborah further testified that she walked into the room ahead of
Williams and noticed that there was no television in the room. Williams lay on the bed and asked her to join him, but she refused, suggesting he get back the money he had paid for the room. Deborah
went to the door, was unable to release the lock, and Williams put his
hand on the door and hollered at her that he "didn't spend $20.00 for
mistake defense.
Moreover, those cases in which the courts were most concerned about the lack of
"harmony" between a defendant's account of the events and the account given by the
complainant are among those in which the defendant's conduct was the most brutal and
therefore least likely to be based upon a credible belief that there was actual consent. In
Vasquez, for example, according to the victim, the defendant crashed through the window
of his ex-wife's bedroom in the middle of the night, ripped her clothes off, and forced her,
screaming and naked, into his car, and then through a series of ordeals punctuated by
repeated rapes and sodomies, including dragging her down a cliff, throwing her over a
barbed wire fence, and pulling her into a river. Peole v. Vasquez 281 Cal. Rptr. 661, 664
(Cal. 1991). As is set out infra in part VII, there is understandable judicial reluctance to
permit a jury to find that a defendant could have been mistaken as to consent on such
facts.
76 841 P.2d at 966.
77 Id. at 962-63.
78 Id. at 963.
79 Id.
80 Id.
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nothing."8 ' She testified that Williams punched her in the left eye
and ordered her onto the bed. After she said "no," he pushed her
down on the bed, got on top of her, and engaged in sexual intercourse. Deborah testified that she screamed and tried to push him off
but could not. After ejaculating, Williams then allowed Deborah to
get up and dress, and offered her $50, which she refused. She left the
room and walked to the San Francisco Hall of Justice, where she re82
ported that she had been raped.
Williams' testimony diverged from that of Deborah S. at the point
at which they entered the hotel room.8 3 He testified that he did not
want or expect to have sex at the hotel, but that once in the room,
Deborah began to kiss and hug him, and to remove her clothes. He
then removed his clothes. He testified that because of diabetes, he
was almost impotent and that Deborah had to fondle his genitals for
ten to fifteen minutes before he could engage in intercourse with her.
After the intercourse, Deborah told him that she needed $50 because
her sister was moving in with her boyfriend. He refused, and testified
that her attitude then "changed completely" and that she threatened
to create a problem for him by telling the shelter manager and her
sister what had happened. He testified that she called him a "welching Nigger," and said that she "knew how to 'fix' him" because she
had been raped by her father and either brother or brothers-in-law.
Angered, Williams slapped her on the right side of her face. He testified that as Deborah dressed, he asked her why she did not wipe away
84
the sperm, and she replied that she wanted to preserve the evidence.
The trial court refused to give an instruction, requested by both
the defense and the prosecution, on the issue of reasonable and good
faith but mistaken belief as to consent. The jury convicted Williams
on two counts of forcible rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals re81 Id
82 1&
83 The Supreme Court characterized Williams' account as "dramatically different" from

that of Deborah S. Id. at 964.
84 Id. In addition to the testimony of these two witnesses, the prosecution offered evidence that Deborah's eye was so swollen she could hardly see out of it and that the injury
was more consistent with a punch than a slap. There was testimony from the examining
nurse and physician that semen was present on vaginal slides, and that Deborah complained of pain on the right side of her neck and along her right side, and of tenderness
along the right side of her uterus. Id. at 963-964. The defense offered evidence from the
hotel clerk that she did not hear any screams or other sounds indicating physical violence,
although she also testified that she might have left the office and even the floor during the
time of the incident. Id. at 967.
All of this testimony would permit ajury to resolve the question of the reasonableness
vel non of defendant's belief of consent. See infra part VII (discussion of the requirement
that belief be reasonable).
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versed, holding that substantial evidence existed to support the requested Mayberry instruction, including the defendant's testimony that
Deborah:
willingly accompanied him to the hotel after spending several hours in
his company, that she did not object when the hotel clerk handed him a
bedsheet, that once inside the room she hugged and kissed him and
initiated sexual intercourse, and that during the hour they were inside
the room the hotel clerk85did not hear any screams or other sounds indicating physical violence.
The California Supreme Court reversed again. It held that a Mayberry defense has two components, one of which is the defendant's
subjective, good faith, "albeit mistaken[ ]" belief that the victim consented. 8 6 The court held that the defendant's burden may be satisfied
only by evidence "of the victim's equivocal conduct on the basis of
87
which [the defendant] erroneously believed there was consent."
Reviewing the sharply conflicting accounts of the two key witnesses, the court concluded that they could not, as a matter of law,
support a Mayberny instruction. In the court's view, Williams' testimony established only actual consent, and Deborah's testimony, "if
believed, would preclude any reasonable belief of consent."8 8 The
court concluded that "[t] hese two wholly divergent accounts create no
middle ground from which Williams could argue he reasonably misinterpreted Deborah's conduct."89 On this basis, it affirmed the trial
court's refusal to give the Maybeny instruction. 90
People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 964-65 (Cal. 1992).
86 Id. at 965.
87 Independent of this subjective component is the additional requirement that the
defendant's belief be objectively reasonable, that it be formed "under circumstances society will tolerate as reasonable." Id. at 965.
88 Id. at 966.
85

89 Id.
90 Id. Similarly, Judge Posner, writing for the the United States Court of Appeals for

the 7th Circuit in Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 697
(1996), rejected a rape defendant's habeaschallenge to the trial court's refusal to instruct
on mistake. In that case, the complainant testified that the defendant had invited her to
go out with him on the evening of the day they first met, that he had picked her up in a
limousine, and that he had asked her to stop briefly at his hotel. She testified that after
using the restroom, she returned to his room to find him in his underwear, and that he
forced her onto the bed and raped her. The defendant testified that he had invited the
complainant to have sex with him, that they kissed and touched in the limousine on the
way to his hotel, and that they engaged in consensual sex. In language paralleling the
Wdliams court's, Judge Posner held that "[n] either Tyson nor [the complainant] testified
to ambiguous words or conduct from which consent might reasonably though erroneously
have been inferred." Id. at 448 (emphasis added). Instead, he explained:
If Tyson was believed, there was actual consent. If [the complainant] was believed,
there had been no manifestation of consent. Of course, the jury might have believed
neither completely, and the question is then whether, had they believed [the complainant] to the extent of agreeing that she had not in fact consented to have sex with
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The Williams court's emphasis on the equivocal nature of the evidence of consent that must be proferred in support of a mistake of
fact defense was not without precedent. Several districts of the Court
of Appeals had used this language in developing approaches to Mayberry.9 ' But the Williams court went a step further, locating the requirement of equivocality in the subjective component of the
reasonable belief defense. It determined that the only evidence which
a court may consider supportive of a defendant's actual or honest belief in consent-as distinguished from the reasonableness of that belief-is evidence of "equivocal" conduct by the complainant
respecting consent. Moreover, it refused to permit evidence that
would support a defense of actual consent, evidence of unequivocal
conduct such as that described by Williams, to support a Mayberny instruction. 92 Instead, the court required the defendant to prove that
he "misinterpreted" the complaining witness's conduct.
The Williams decision is peculiar for a number of reasons, some
of which lie in the analysis itself, and others which become apparent
only when considered in the context of other areas of criminal law. 93
It is strange to think that the quality of the evidence that might support a defendant's honest, good faith belief in consent should not
only be different in kind from that which demonstrates actual consent, but also less certain and more ambiguous than evidence of
i

Tyson, they might nevertheless have found that Tyson could reasonably have misunderstood her words or behavior as expressing consent. Given the case as it was
presented to the jury, such a finding would have been so speculative as to be
unreasonable.
Id.
Similarly, the Indiana Court of Appeals held, on direct appeal of that case, that defendant's testimony of a consensual encounter
is a plain assertion of actual consent. From this testimony, a reasonable jury could
infer only that [the complainant] consented to sexual intercourse. There is no recitation of equivocal conduct by [the complainant] which reasonably could have led Tyson to believe that [she] only appeared to consent to the charged sexual conduct; no
gray area exists from which Tyson can logically argue that he misunderstood her
actions.
Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276, 295 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996).
The court went so far as to quote the dictionary definition of "equivocal": " ' having two or
more significations: capable of more than one interpretation: of doubtful meaning: ambiguous.'" Id. n.22 (quoting WEBSTE'S THuD NEW INTERAATOrNAL DICr'oNARY 769 (1976)).
Although the Indiana court neither cited nor referred to Williams, it seems clear that
the court was aware of that decision, since, unlike California, there is no precedent in
Indiana law for the court's emphasis on the term "equivocal.".
91 Seesupra part H(C).
92 The court expressly rejected the rule adopted by at least one intermediate appellate
court, that the Mayberny instruction should be given in every case in which "[actual] consent
is offered as a defense to a charge of rape." Wdlliams, 841 P.2d at 966 n.7.
93 Examples of the latter category include issues regarding the consequences of applying a rule of equivocality to the defense of mistake of fact when it arises as to offenses other
than rape, see infra, part IV, and the role of the jury in criminal cases. See infrta, part V.
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actual consent. A defendant's testimony that a complainant participated enthusiastically in sexual conduct would, under Williams, be less
probative of his good faith belief that she consented than would testimony of "equivocal conduct," such as testimony suggesting that the
94
complainant was reluctant, or even that she expressed non-consent.
This proposition is certainly counterintuitive, and the court provides
no explanation to redress this concern.
Still more peculiar is the idea that the equivocal nature of evidence of consent should be deemed an element of the subjective component of the defense, the part which asks, "What did this defendant
actually believe?" A defendant's description of events contains, of necessity, an implicit statement that he believed the events to be as he
described them. 95 Indeed, since a defendant has no insight into the
complainant's state of mind except through his own perceptions and
beliefs, his testimony regarding her consent can only be testimony as
to his perception of her consent, that is, his belief as to consent. A
description of unequivocal consent must imply that the defendant
honestly believed the person whose conduct he describes actually consented. The equivocal or unequivocal nature of a complainant's conduct can only be probative of the reasonableness of the defendant's
96
belief, not its authenticity or existence.
An additional peculiarity, given the general rule regarding the
quantum of evidence necessary for a jury instruction, is the court's
assumption that certain evidence, such as the defendant's testimony,
might support a Maybery instruction on its own, but, depending upon
94 Indeed, "unequivocal" evidence might, under Williams, not only be less probative of
a good faith belief in consent, but not probative at all.
95 Testimony of a defendant that the complainant's conduct was consistent with consent, but that he himself did not believe her to be consenting, would support neither an
actual consent defense nor a mistake of fact as to consent defense, since such a defendant
would be admitting that he did not honestly or actually have such a belief. See supranote
65. In the absence of such an express disavowal, however, a description of conduct indicating consent ordinarily contains an implicit declaration of defendant's belief that the complainant in fact consented.
96 One can imagine a scenario in which the evidence of consent is so minimal as to fall
below the established threshhold for an instruction on either actual consent or reasonable
belief in consent. If, for example, the defendant offers no evidence of consent, or testifies
that the complainant said "no," a trial court might conclude that the evidence of belief of
consent was too insubstantial to warrant the jury's consideration of those defenses. The
British case of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan might fall into this category.
Applying an entirely subjective standard for belief as to consent, the court nevertheless
concluded that no jury could have found that the defendant actually believed there was
consent since the complainant's conduct, as described by the defendant, was entirely inconsistent with consent, and the only source of the defendant's purported belief was a
statement by someone without the capacity to consent, the complainant's husband. This
is, however, distinguishable from a rule that creates a chasm between the defendant's perception and that which he perceives to be "true."

1996]

ERODING THE DEFENSE OF MISTAKE OF FACT

837

other evidence offered at trial, might not support that same instruction.97 Although it might well be that other evidence, available to and
credited by a jury, would cause them to conclude that a defendant's
belief was not reasonable, such other evidence is ordinarily not to be
weighed by the instructing court in deciding whether the defendant's
testimony supports an instruction. 98 Either it does or it does not.99
The Williams court emphasized the erroneous nature of those beliefs that give rise to a Mayberiy instruction, explaining that "as the
language implies, a mistake of fact occurs when one perceives facts
differently from how they actually exist."100 This drift in emphasis
97 The rule, then, purports to permit the complainant's testimony of non-consent to
prove the defendant's state of mind with respect to consent, while at the same time barring
the inverse.
98 See, e.g., People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1,10 (Cal. 1979) ("A trial court should not, however, measure the substantiality of the evidence by undertaking to weigh the credibility of
the witnesses, a task exclusively relegated to the jury.").
99 A still more egregious example of the kind of weighing done by the Williams court
occurred in the Tyson case, both on direct appeal and in the federal habeas case. Judge
Posner rejected defendant's contentions regarding a mistake instruction after finding that
there was a "lack of any hint in [the complainant's]testimony of words or acts by which she

might have manifested consent... ." Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 448-49 (7th Cir. 1995),
cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996) (emphasis added). He did not explain why support for
the requested instruction had to be located in the testimony of a particular witness. Worse,
the Indiana Court of Appeals considered testimony by the complainant that she responded
affirmatively when asked by the defendant if she wanted "to get on top," and that she asked
defendant to use a condom, in addition to the defendant's own testimony of enthusiastic
consensual conduct by the complainant. It held that such evidence was inadequate to
support an instruction on mistake of fact, reasoning that, "inthe context in which these
statements occurred, that is, amidst [the complainant's] unequivocal description of a sexual assault, they could not, as a matter of law, lead a reasonable person to believe that Tyson was
reasonably mistaken as to [the complainant's] consent to sexual intercourse." Tyson v.
State, 619 N.E.2d 276, 295-96 (Ind.Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996) (emphasis added). Here the court plainly, if apparently unwittingly, made a determination of
credibility, finding that the complainant's testimony was true and therefore a bar to the
belief in consent as to which defendant offered testimony.
George Fletcher has observed that, with respect to this aspect of the court's decision in
Tyson, "the Indiana Court of Appeal developed an odd theory of consent that, in effect,
privileges the testimony of the alleged victim in rape cases. If she testifies clearly to conduct of resistance, that she said no instead of maybe, there is no 'equivocal conduct.'"
Instead, he suggests, the court's approach amounts to "accord[ing] to a woman complaining of rape a presumption of honesty and objectivity." GEORGE FLETCHER, WrrHJusTIcE FOR SOME 131 (1995).

100 People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961 (Cal. 1992). See also Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d at 448
("Neither Tyson nor [the complainant] testified to ambiguous words or conduct from
which consent might reasonably though erroneously have been inferred.") (emphasis added);
Commonwealth v. ionda, 599 N.E.2d 635, 641 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) ('he defendant did
not claim to have been confused, misled, or mistaken.").
In this part of its analysis, the Wdliams court described how belief as to the termination
of a previous marriage in a bigamy prosecution or as to the age of a sexual partner in a
statutory rape prosecution would similarly be valid only if erroneous. Williams, 841 P.2d at
966. Yet it failed to pursue its rule of equivocality into these and other areas in which the
mistake defense has been applied. As is set out suprain part IV,the rule of equivocality is
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away from "reasonable belief' and toward "mistake," already evident
in many of the post-Maybery cases, infects the court's analysis by assuming that the error must be contained within the defendant's own
perception of the events, rather than being demonstrable through the
testimony of another. 0 1 Of course, any defendant whose own testimony acknowledged the possibility of error would have a difficult time
persuading a jury of the honesty and good faith of his belief as to
consent. At a minimum, such testimony would preclude a jury from
acquitting on the theory of actual consent, since it would require the
10 2
defendant to acknowledge that there was none.
The combined effect of these peculiarities virtually eliminates the
defense of mistake of fact in rape. Those defendants who, as a factual
matter, would present the strongest mistake case, by testifying to conduct that could be characterized as "unequivocal," are precluded by
the rule of Williams from presenting that defense to the jury. That is,
those who give the most persuasive and consistent account of events
will, by virtue of the strength of their testimony, be unable to reach
the jury on the issue of mistake as to consent. Conversely, those
whose testimony escapes the bar imposed upon "unequivocal" evidence will face a different, equally imposing, obstacle: their testimony
will contain its own refutation.10 3 A defendant who describes an ennot applied to any other offense and, as to offenses like bigamy and statutory rape, cannot
coherently be applied.
101 Cf Williams, 841 P.2d at 970 (Mosk,J., concurring) ("It is not the mistaken belief that
negates the requisite 'wrongful intent,' but simply the belief itself') (emphasis in original).
In State v. Tyson, the Indiana Court of Appeals expanded upon this aspect of the
Williams court's reasoning: ,
Tyson's description is a plain assertion of actual consent. From this testimony, a reasonable jury could infer only that [the complainant] actually consented to sexual intercourse. There is no recitation of equivocal conduct by [the complainant] which
reasonably could have led Tyson to believe that [she] only appeared to consent to the charged
sexual conduct; no gray area existsfrom which Tyson can logically argue that he misunderstood
[her] actions.
State v. Tyson, 619 N.E.2d at 295 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Similarly, in Tyson v. Trigg, the court held that "[n]othing in Tyson's testimony gave a hint of possible
misunderstanding. According to him, [the complainant] had been not merely a willing
but an enthusiastic participant. Obviously the jury disbelieved this. Nothing in [the complainant's] testimony gave a hint of possible misunderstanding either." Tyson v. Trigg, 50
F.3d at 448.
102 The impact of this aspect of Williams is to require a defendant to elect between the
defense of actual consent and that of mistake as to consent. Since a criminal defendant is
entitled to offer multiple, and even inconsistent, defenses, see supra note 61, this rule may
be constitutionally flawed. Moreover, as indicated above, the defenses are not only not
inconsistent (an insufficient basis to force a defendant to elect between two defenses) but
are instead necessarily consistent.
103 See Williams, 841 P.2d at 970 (Mosk, J., concurring) ("to offer the defense [a defendant] would have to take the position that he was mistaken about the complainant's consent-and thereby admit, at least by implication, that the complainant did not in fact
consent. This is illogical") (emphasis in original).
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counter in which the complainant's conduct was admittedly equivocal
as to consent essentially concedes that point and is doomed to almost
10 4
certain conviction.
A further surprising aspect of the Williams decision is that the undisputed testimony as to the circumstances surrounding the sexual
conduct suggests far more "equivocality" than, for example, is found
in the Mayberry case itself. Where the defendant in Mayberry was a
stranger who accosted the complainant on the street, grabbing her
arm and blocking her path, 05 the defendant in Williams was at least a
casual acquaintance of the complainant, who voluntarily spent much
of the morning with defendant. 06 In Mayberny, the defendant threw a
bottle at the complainant, knocked her to the sidewalk, and
threatened to punch all her teeth out if she did not accompany him to
the scene of the sexual conduct'10 7 In Williams, the complainant willingly accompanied the defendant into the hotel room, even after seeing the clerk hand him a bedsheet in exchange for a $20 payment 0
Moreover, the Williams complainant, according to her testimony, did
not encounter any forceful conduct until after entering the hotel
room, 09 whereas the complainant in Mayberny was assaulted both
before and after entering the apartment where the sexual conduct
took place."10 Nevertheless, the facts of Mayberry produced the broad
rule allowing the mistake defense in rape, and the facts of Williams
provide the basis for the limiting requirement of equivocality. At a
minimum, the Williams court's interpretation of Mayberny, to require
equivocal evidence of consent ignores these significant aspects of the
case."' In fact, under Williams, Mayberry would not have been entiEquivocality is, ordinarily, not an asset when determining the probative value of a
wimess's testimony. See, e.g., People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1979) (affirming trial
court's refusal to instruct on intoxication defense where defendant's testimony as to intoxi-

cation was "equivocal").
104

This rule works to the victim's detriment as well as to the defendant's: if equivocal

evidence, such as moderate or intermittent resistance, is deemed to be probative of mistake, then no resistance whatsoever might, by the same reasoning, be permitted to support
a finding of actual consent. Once again, the legal rule has the effect of shifting scrutiny
away from the defendant's conduct and onto that of the complainant. See Berliner, supra
note 49, at 2699.
105 People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Cal. 1975).
106 841 P.2d at 963. This is not to suggest that a mistake defense ought properly to be
limited to so-called date rape cases, but instead to highlight that, ordinarily, there is
greater difficulty in persuading ajury as to a defendant's good faith and reasonable belief
of consent where the complainant is a stranger to the defendant.
107 542 P.2d at 1340.
108 841 P.2d at 963.
109 Id

110 542 P.2d at 1340-41.
111 It can hardly be said that Ms. B.'s testimony of "putting on an act" to persuade Mayberry to let her go, or failing to seek help, could eclipse the extreme brutality that she
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12

AND MISTAKE OF FACT AS TO OTHER OFFENSES

A further flaw in Williams' rationale is the absence of any suggestion that equivocality is necessary to the defense of mistake of fact
generally, as applied to other offenses to which it has long been regarded as a valid defense. Considering the long list of offenses to
which a defense of mistake has been available, and then turning to the
crime of statutory rape and the rules regarding imperfect self-defense,
it becomes apparent that equivocal evidence has never been necessary
for the defense of mistake in these areas." 3 Instead, decisions regarding mistake as to non-sexual offenses make it plain that the same unequivocal evidence that gives rise to a defense of actual innocence also
14
supports the defense of mistake.
The defense of mistake of fact has a history far longer than thirty
years when offered against charges other than rape. In addition, its
scope has been wide: it has been deemed a viable defense to the complete array of theft offenses, including larceny, 115 receipt of stolen
described and permit Mayberry to form an erroneous belief as to her consent when Williams could not, as a matter of law, have formed such a belief with far more basis for doing
so. The only way that the jury in Maybeny could find that the defendant had a good-faith,
reasonable belief as to Ms. S's consent would be if it disbelieved significant portions of her

testimony, including her description of force and threats of force, while crediting her as to
the ultimate issue of consent. Yet it is this parsing of witness testimony that the Williams
court neither contemplates nor permits.
112 The notorious incident of the Texas "condom rapist" also illustrates the peculiarity
of the rule and the danger in shifting the focus from defendant's to complainant's conduct. In that case, the complainant's request-after the defendant had broken into her
apartment in the middle of the night-that defendant wear a condom might easily be
characterized as "equivocal" conduct, permitting a mistake instruction on facts far more
egregiously nonconsensual than those in Williams. See Second Jury ChargesMan in Condom
Rape Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1992, at A15 (noting that the first grand jury refused to
indict since "some jurors believed that the woman's handing [defendant] a condom, which
she described as an act of self-protection against AIDS, might have implied her consent"
and quoting the defendant's testimony that "She's the one who gave me the condom ....
If she didn't want to, why would she give me the condom?").
113 Nor would a rule of equivocality make any more sense as applied to these other
offenses than in does in the context of rape.
As George Fletcher succintly demonstrates, in the context of offenses other than rape,
the rule of equivocality "cannot withstand two minutes of serious analysis." GEORGE
FLETCHER, WrrHJSTICE FOR SOME 130 (1995). Writing about the rule as it emerged in the

Tyson decision, Fletcher gives the example of a man who spots what "clearly appears to be a
scarecrow," and who then shoots at that apparition. The scarecrow turns out to be a man
in a scarecrow disguise, but there is "nothing equivocal about his likeness to an object that
may be shot with impunity." Id. According to the Tyson court, the shooter is guilty of
murder, since he cannot assert a defense of reasonable mistake. Id.
114 That the one is a justification and the other an excuse does not account for this
difference in treatment.
115 See, e.g., People v. Devine, 80 P. 378 (Cal. 1892).
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goods,1 16 and robbery,"17 as well as burglary," s kidnapping," 9 forgery, 120 embezzling,' 2 ' non-support, 122 resisting arrest, and even assault.' 23 Indeed, the contemporary formulation of the rule of mistake
is not offense-specific, but instead defines mistakes that will operate as
defenses to include all mistakes (either of fact or law) which negative
12 4
the mens rea required to establish a material element of an offense.
Moreover, no formulation of the general rule of mistake contains an
evidentiary threshhold of any kind, much less a rule of equivocality as
to the evidence supporting mistake. Accordingly, there appears to be
no contextual justification for modification of the defense in cases of
5
rape. 2
The offense of bigamy illustrates well the general application of
the defense of mistake, as well as the oddity of adopting a rule of
equivocality. While the availabilty of a mistake defense to bigamy varies among jurisdictions, 12 6 no jurisdiction makes the defense contingent upon a requirement that evidence of mistake be equivocal, nor
would such a contingency make sense. Instead, the division of authority arises from conflicting state court interpretations of the mens rea
See, e.g., People v. Osborne, 77 Cal. App. 3d 472 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
117 See, e.g., People v. Butler, 421 P.2d 703 (Cal. 1967).
118 See, e.g., People v. Lohbauer, 627 P.2d 183 (Cal. 1981) (defendant could not be convicted of burglary when he believed he had permission to enter and was honestly and
reasonably mistaken about whose home he entered).
119 See, e.g., People v. Howard, 686 P.2d 644 (Cal. 1984) (Bird, J. concurring) (honest
and reasonable belief that defendant had reconciled with his wife and therefore had custody would preclude conviction for child stealing).
120 See, e.g., People v. Crowder, 272 P.2d 775 (Cal. 1954).
121 See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 1317 (Cal. 1976).
122 See, e.g., People v. Clarke, 304 P.2d 271 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1956) (honest
and reasonable belief that defendant was not the father precluded conviction for nonsupport of child).
123 See, e.g., People v. Sanchez, 83 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1978)
(mistake as to consent is a defense to charge of assault).
124 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.04(1) (a).
125 I do not mean to suggest that the law of mistake occupies an area of monolithic
consistency. There has always been variation among jurisdictions as to the availability of
mistake for particular crimes, but this variation is consistent with the general contours of
the defense, and is therefore different in kind from the radical departure represented by
the rule of equivocality. Where the definition of an offense is ambiguous or silent as to
what, if any, mens rea is required for its commission, differentjurisdictions have construed
the definition as either requiring or repudiating proof of intent. The concomitant result is
that where no proof of intent is required, a mistake that negatives such intent will be no
defense. See LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 12, at § 5.1(b) ("uncertainty in criminal legislation as to what mental state, if any, is required-has also accounted for much of the confusion in this area").
116

126 See infro, note 127. See also, MODEL PENAL CODE § 230(1) (d) (defense available if

"actor reasonably believes that he is legally eligible to remarry"); M. C. Dransfield, Annotation, Mistaken Belief in Existence, Validity, or Effect of Divorce or Separation as Defense to Prosecution for Bigamy or Allied Offense 56 A.L.1K2d 915 (1957).
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requirements of their bigamy statutes. 127 This is consistent with the
well settled view of the defense of mistake as no more than a reiteration of the fundamental principle that a failure of proof of mens rea
128
requires an acquittal.
It is difficult to imagine a rule in bigamy cases that would limit
the defense of mistake to instances in which evidence of mistake is
"equivocal" as that term has been used in Williams and elsewhere. Of
what would such evidence consist? Most likely, a defendant in a case
of bigamy will offer proof of the termination of the prior marriage. 12 9
If accepted, that proof could result in ajudgment that the defendant
had not committed the offense of bigamy. Significantly, the same proof
would also form the basis for a defendant's honest (and perhaps reasonable) belief that the prior marriage had been terminated,
although other evidence demonstrated that it had not.5 0 Thus, unlike in Williams, the unequivocal testimony of a defendant that he or
she actually believed that the prior marriage had been terminated
127 In those states that have construed their bigamy statutes to contain no mens rea

component, the defense is unavailable. See generally LAFAVE & ScO-r, supranote 12, at § 5.1
(explaining that this construction has usually been based upon one of three principles: a)
that in specifying certain defenses to bigamy, a legislature thereby intended to be exhaustive; b) that any legislative requirement of mens rea would have been explicit if intended;
and c) that "the statutory language... favored the policy that those who remarry do so at
their peril."). Each of these theories for refusing a defense of mistake is consistent with the
general principle, noted above, that the defense is really no more than a restatement of the
broader proposition that a failure to prove the mens rea required for an offense must
result in an acquittal. See, e.g., People v. Spoor, 85 N.E. 207 (Ill.
1908); State v. Trainer, 134
S.W. 528 (Mo. 1911); Manahan v. State, 219 S.W.2d 900 (Tenn. 1949); State v. Hendrickson, 245 P. 375 (Utah 1926).
Conversely, in those states that have interpreted their bigamy statutes to require mens
rea, the defense is available. Hendrickson, 245 P. at 375. (noting that the "more carefully
reasoned decisions" hold that legislative silence does not connote an intent to create strict
liability for this offense, and that "for an offense as serious as bigamy, it should be presumed that the legislature intended to follow the usual mens rea requirement unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication'"). See alsoPeople v. Vogel, 299 P.2d 850 (Cal.
1956) (recognizing the defense of mistake to a charge of bigamy) cited in People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964) and People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975);
Alexander v. United States, 136 F.2d 783 (D.C. 1943); Robinson v. State, 65 S.E. 792 (Ga.
App. 1909); Lesueur v. State, 95 N.E. 239 (Ind. 1911); Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 168
(1889).
128 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
129 For example, in the California case of People v. Vogel, 299 P.2d 850 (Cal. 1956), the
defendant offered to testify that his wife had told him she was going to divorce him, and
offered additional evidence tending to prove that she had married another man during
defendant's absence on active duty in the Korean War. Id. at 852.
130 See, e.g., Vogei 299 P.2d at 855 (noting that "[t]he same evidence that would tend to
prove an actual marriage, if offered by the People, could reasonably form the basis for an
honest belief by a defendant that there was such marriage, that it was legally entered into,
and that he was, therefore, free to remarry"). Vogelwas one of the key cases in the analysis
of the California Supreme Court in both Hernandez and Maybery. See Hernandez, 393 P.2d
at 676-77; Mayberry, 542 P.2d at 1344-45.
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would be adequate to raise the defense of mistake, and to support an
instruction to the jury on that issue, regardless of any other evidence
in the case.
Prosecution evidence that the marriage had not in fact been terminated is equally unlikely to be "equivocal"; instead, it would probably be objective in nature, consisting of court records of a divorce
judgment deemed to be invalid as a matter of law (or otherwise not
susceptible to conflicting interpretations), or the appearance in court
of a supposedly deceased spouse. The offense would be proven and
the sole question for the jury would be the honesty and reasonableness of the defendant's belief that the prior marriage had been terminated. In finding that the defendant did make a reasonable mistake,
a jury would have credited some of both the prosecution's and the
defense's evidence, but would nevertheless acquit. Nothing in the defense of mistake as applied to bigamy compels a jury to adopt one
advocate's evidence to the exclusion of the other's.' 3 '
Moreover, a defendant who testified that she believed the prior
marriage had been terminated because of evidence that she acknowl132
edged to be equivoca4 whether evidence of the first spouse's death
133
or divorce,
would be hard pressed to persuade a jury as to either
the genuineness or reasonableness of her belief. Acknowledgement
of the equivocal character of circumstances upon which a defendant
purports to rely as to a matter of such importance would be the death
knell to a good faith mistake defense as well as to a defense of reasonable mistake.
A similar pattern appears when considering mistake as a defense
to statutory rape. As with bigamy, a split exists among jurisdictions as
to whether to recognize a defense of reasonable mistake as to age at
all. It is not, however, contingent upon the equivocal nature of the
proof of age, but upon determination of a preceding question,
131 This is true for all offenses other than rape to which the defense is recognized.

132 An example might be conflicting testimony regarding an accident. See generally Annotation, Validity ofMarriage CelebratedWhile Spouse by FormerMarriageof One of the Partieswas
Living and Undivorced, in Reliance Upon Presumptionfrom Lapse of Time of Death of Such Spouse,

93 A.LR. 345 (1934); Annotation, Validity of Marriage Celebrated While Spouse by FormerMarriage of One of the Partieswas Living and Undivorced, in Reliance Upon Presumptionfrom Lapse of
Time of Death of Such Spouse, 144 A.L.R. 747 (1943).
133 An example might be conflicting evidence about steps taken by either spouse to
secure a divorce. See, e.g., Ellison v State, 129 So. 887, 888 (Fla. 1930) (finding that defendant was told by his wife that she had secured a divorce and remarried); State v. Trainer, 134
S.W. 528 (Mo. 1911) (stating that defendant believed he was divorced based upon publication in newspaper of notice of spouse's action for divorce); State v. Nicholas, 86 S.E.2d 202
(N.C. 1955) (stating that defendant in bigamy prosecution testified that'he had hired a
lawyer to obtain a divorce and believed the lawyer had done so).
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namely the mens rea, if any, required for the offense. 34 As in the case
of bigamy, it would be difficult to conceive of equivocal evidence in
this context. More often than not, a defendant will offer unequivocal
testimony as to circumstances which caused him honestly (and perhaps reasonably) to believe that his sexual partner was above the statutory age of consent. If credited, this evidence could support either a
defense of actual innocence (i.e., a conclusion that the complainant
was in fact over the age of consent), or a defense of reasonable belief
as to age.
The probability of equivocal evidence being offered by the prosecution is similarly slim. Most often, objective evidence demonstrates
the actual age of the complainant, and, if credited, reduces the issue
for the jury to that of the honesty and reasonableness of the defendant's mistaken belief that the complainant was older. A defendant
need not acknowledge the error of his belief as a precondition of access to the defense of mistake. Indeed, as with bigamy, the prospect
of a defendant persuading a jury on this issue would be remote once
he testifies that the circumstances were such that he was uncertain as
135
to the complainant's age.
A final example of an area of law in which the defense of mistake
has been recognized without the limitations imposed in Williams and
elsewhere is that of self-defense and imperfect (or incomplete or unreasonable) self-defense. Here again, there is no requirement of
equivocality as a prerequisite to a mistake defense. Indeed, there has
been explicit recognition of the fact that the same evidence that might
support a complete justification of the use of force would also support
a claim of mitigation based upon an erroneous perception of the
need to use such force.' 3 6 Whether the verdict is self-defense or imSee supra note 29-30 and accompanying text.
Because of problems of proof unique to the offense, rape is a particularly poor candidate for application of a rule of equivocality. Unlike the crimes of bigamy and statutory
rape, where proof of the element as to which a defendant is likely to be mistaken is objectively verifiable, a charge of rape requires examination of the complainant's state of mind
in order to resolve the issue as to which defendant claims to be mistaken, namely consent.
136 See, e.g., People v. McKelvy, 239 Cal. Rptr. 782, 788 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) ("[T]he
evidentiary consideration that led the trial court and counsel to agree on the need for
instructions regarding self-defense lead with equal force to the need for instructions regarding unreasonable self-defense"); People v. Ceja, 31 Cal. Rptr. 475 (Cal. 1994). See also
In re Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th 768 (1994).
In the leading California case of People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979), the issue
presented was whether evidence supporting a requested self-defense instruction also compelled the court to instruct sua sponte on imperfect self-defense. The California Supreme
Court held that it did, but affirmed the conviction on the separate ground that, at the time
of trial, "[g]iven the undeveloped state of the reasonable belief rule," the court had no
duty to instruct on it sua sponte. The court did, however, announce that "[iun the light of
the instant development of the reasonable belief rule... we see no reason why in cases not
134
135
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perfect self-defense depends not upon the equivocal character of the
evidence supporting a defendant's belief, but instead upon the
factfinder's resolution of unequivocal, even conflicting, evidence as to
37
the reasonableness of that belief.'
Self-defense is available to an actor who is not the aggressor in an
encounter and who "reasonably believes (a) that he is in immediate
danger of unlawful bodily harm from his adversary and (b) that the
use of such force is necessary to avoid this danger." 13 8 Imperfect selfdefense is available not as a justification of the use of force, but as a
circumstance mitigating the use of force and reducing the offense to
one of lesser degree, usually manslaughter. It is available where the
actor "holds an honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to deyet tried the court should not be so informed as to give the instruction sua sponte." Flan-

nel, 603 P.2d at 9. For a discussion of the distinction between requested and sua sponte
instructions, see supra note 61.
137 People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d at 7 ("It is the honest belief of imminent peril that negates malice in a case of complete self-defense; the reasonableness of the belief simply goes
to the justification for the killing.").
Under one view, there is a somewhat imperfect fit when applying principles of mistake
to the rule of self-defense. Some courts have held that the mistake does not so much
negative defendant's culpability for the offense as it negatives an element of the defense
(the necessity of using force/reasonableness of the perception of imminent use of force by
another). See, e.g., Hoskins v. State, 563 N.E.2d 571, 576 (Ind. 1990) (holding mistake of
fact instruction not available in self-defense case because defendant's mistake as to whether
victim was armed "does not satisfy the requirement that the defendant's culpability be negated."). Alternatively, as other courts have held, a belief in the necessity of the use of
force, whether reasonable or not, negatives the element of malice. See Flanne!,603 P.2d at
6-7 ("Malice aforethought is a specific mental state and.., a defendant may show that he
lacked that mental state when it is an essential element of the offense of which he stands
accused .... [W]e cannot accept the People's claim that an honest belief, if unreasonably
held, can be consistent with malice.") (quoting in part People v. Conley, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815,
819 (Cal. 1966)); McKelvy, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 786 ("Although the 'malice' required for the
offense of mayhem differs from the 'malice aforethought' with which Flannel was concerned, it is equally true in both cases that the requisite state of mind is inconsistent with a
genuine belief in the need for self defense.").
I believe the analogy is apt, since the relationship between the defendant's perception
of events and the actual events at issue closely parallels that seen in the context of mistake
as to consent and actual consent in rape. See Beckford v. Regina, App. Cas. 130, 144 (P.C.
1988) (drawing same analogy, although applying a purely subjective standard to both and
stating "If then a genuine belief, albeit without reasonable grounds, is a defense to rape
because it negatives the necessary intention, so also must a genuine belief in facts which if
true would justify self-defence be a defence to a crime of personal violence because the
belief negatives the intent to act unlawfully").
138 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 12 at § 5.7. See, e.g., Flanne; 603 P.2d at 4 ("To be exculpated on a theory of self-defense one must have an honest and reasonable belief in the
need to defend.").
The Model Penal Code, as well as British law, define self-defense subjectively, without
reference to the reasonableness of an actor's belief. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (use of
force is justifiable when an actor "believes that such force is immediately necessary for the
purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on
the present occasion"); Beckford v. Regina, App. Cas. at 144.
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fend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury."1 3 9 Accordingly, a defendant's perception of the need to use force can and does
support two different defenses to charges arising from that use of
force, whether or not the defendant's perception is grounded in
equivocal evidence. This is a significant departure from the Williams
rule, which, again, locates the need for equivocality in the subjective
part of the mistake standard, and regards the two defenses as so distinct that they require different evidentiary foundations.
As with the actor who asserts either a consent defense or a mistake as to consent defense in rape, the actor claiming self-defense or
imperfect self-defense must actually believe that he or she is in danger
and that force is necessary to avoid the danger. 140 But the evidence of
this belief need not be equivocal. On the contrary, a defendant's unequivocal evidence of a belief as to the need to repel imminent use of
force should and does support instructions on both self-defense and
imperfect self-defense. For example, where a defendant testified that
the victim "came toward him, grabbed his chest," and then drew his
knife, but other testimony shows that the victim never drew a knife
and that defendant fired a gun at the victim from a distance of approximately two feet, both a self-defense instruction and an unreasonable self-defense instruction were deemed warranted. 1 4 1 And where
defendant testified that the victim threatened him with a beer bottle,
that defendant held a pool cue in front of him to protect himself, and
that the victim fell into the cue, but where other testimony shows that
the victim was sitting in a chair sipping a beer when the defendant
approached and hit her in the eye with a sudden upward thrust of the
pool cue, instructions on both defenses were again deemed warranted.142 In these cases, no less than in the rape cases described
above, the testimony of the defendant and others cannot be "harmonized," but are instead at odds with each other. Indeed, imperfect
self-defense is predicated upon an unreasonable belief, and is therefore perhaps a better candidate for a rule of equivocality than reasonable mistake as to consent in rape, which is limited to reasonable
139 Flanne 603 P.2d at 2.
140 See Flanne4 603 P.2d at 5 (quoting People v. Sedeno, 518 P.2d 913, 923 (Cal. 1974),

the court emphasized "the close relationship between a defendant's claim of self-defense
and the unreasonable belief doctrine. 'Since there was no evidence that defendant believed he was acting in self defense, there was likewise no basis for an instruction on the
effect of an unreasonable belief that deadly force was necessary in defense of self"). Cf.
supranote 65, (discussing the requirement that a defendant actually and honestly believe
that the complainant consented in order to raise either the defense of actual consent or
reasonable belief).
141 Flanne, 603 P.2d at 3.
142 People v. McKelvy, 239 Cal. Rptr. 782, 783-784 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
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mistakes. Nevertheless, the jury may consider the credibility of the
defendant's testimony to support the conclusion that he actually perceived an imminent threat, even if the jury also concludes that there
was no such threat and that the perception was therefore not reasonable. In this area of law, then, equivocality has no place.
When considering the defense of mistake to crimes generally and
the plain incongruity of a notion of equivocality as an evidentiary
predicate to raising that defense, the limitation imposed upon the use
of mistake as a defense in rape emerges as an anomaly. In section VI,
infra, I consider other rules of law that are applied with similar disparity to rape.
V.

THE RuLE OF EQUIVOCALITY AND THE ROLE OF THE JURY

The impact of the rule of equivocality described above reaches
beyond questions of consistency within substantive criminal law, and
undermines fundamental assumptions about the trial process. In effect, the rule creates a categorical barrier to jury consideration of a
body of highly probative evidence without explicitly identifying any
countervailing policy consideration to warrant such a barrier. 14 3 Examples of such barriers are far from uncommon in the law of evidence, but they are ordinarily the product of a frank election between
or among conflicting policy goals."4 In this area, however, the election is covert, discoverable only after a close analysis of the rhetoric
surrounding it.145 The impact of the rule of equivocality on this aspect of the jury's role sets the offense of rape apart from other crimes,
creating a rule of admissibility that has as its threshhold not the weight
or quality of the evidence, but the nature of the offense charged.
In addition, the rule imposes a rigid sequencing upon the issues
to be considered and resolved by the jury. Again, in no other area is
the jury constrained to consider the elements of an offense in a particular order. The rule of equivocality requires that there be a determi148 To the extent that this categorical bar precludes jury consideration of an issue as to
which there is some evidence, it not only thwarts the jury function, but also compromises a
defendant's constitutionally protected right to have thejury determine every material issue
and every theory supported by some evidence. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 582 (1986).
See also People v. Modesto, 31 Cal Rptr. 225 (Cal. 1963), cited in People v. Mayberry, 542
P.2d 1337, 1343 (Cal. 1975); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127 ("jurors are the exclusive judges of
all questions of fact submitted to them and of the credibility of witnesses"). These concerns
are beyond the scope of this Article.
144 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407 (excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures);
FED. R. EVID. 408 (excluding evidence of offer or acceptance of valuable consideration in
compromising or attempting to compromise a claim); FED. R. EvmD. 609 (excluding evidence of some prior convictions).
145 See infra, part VII, for that analysis.
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nation by the jury that the complainant did not consent before they
will be permitted to consider whether or not the defendant had the
mental state necessary to commit the offense.' 4 6 As to all other offenses, a jury is free to acquit upon concluding that the prosecution
failed to meet its burden of proof as to any single element, including
the defendant's mens rea. If, for example, the jury were divided on
the question of the complainant's consent, they should nevertheless
be free to acquit if they were united in their conclusion that the defendant reasonably believed she consented. 14 7 This cannot happen
after Williams.14 8

Perhaps most significantly, the rule of equivocality precludes the
jury from parsing witness testimony and making mixed determinations of credibility. It does not allow for the possibility that ajury may
find the "truth" to be somewhere between the narratives of the defendant and the complainant. The Williams court speaks of the testimony of the complainant and defendant as two entireties, between
which ajury must elect.149 It does not appear to consider the unsurprising, indeed likely, possibility that a jury might accept portions of
each witness's testimony and reject other portions, concluding perhaps that there was no consent but that the defendant honestly and
reasonably believed that there was. 150
146 Cf People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 970 (Cal. 1992) (MoskJ., concurring) (the rule
of equivocality would "virtually bar the jury from entertaining a reasonable doubt about

the intent element until it resolves the no-consent element in the People's favor.... It
cannot properly be forced to first determine the no-consent element itself beyond a reasonable doubt").
147 See People v. Williams, 841 P.2d at 970 (Mosk, J., concurring). See also infra p. 851
(diagram).
148 Williams contorts the ordinary sequence in which the judge's instructions to the jury
precede the jury's evaluation of the evidence.
149 841 P.2d at 966. The court quoted from People v. Rhoades, 238 Cal. Rptr. 909, 914
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987), in which the Court of Appeal concluded, on similarly conflicting
testimony, that the "sexual act was [either] entirely consensual or the obvious product of
force." See also Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276, 297 (Ind.Ct. App. 1993) ("[Ain examination of the testimony of [the complainant] and Tyson, the only testimony available as to
the events in the hotel room, reveals evidence of only consent or compulsion; there is no
evidence of equivocal conduct that a reasonable person in Tyson's position could have
reasonably misinterpreted as [the complainant's] consent to the charged sexual conduct
.... Their respective testimonies describe two different and irreconcilable events that
cannot be harmonized and taken together to provide evidentiary support for the instruction in question."); Commonwealth v. Fionda, 599 N.E.2d 635, 641 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992)
("The victim testified to her words and actions, none of which was ambiguous .... The
question for the jury was whether they believed the victim or the defendant.").
150 See People v. Ceja, 31 Cal. Rptr. 475, 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
Indeed, the Mayberry decision itself noted that "part" of the complainant's testimony
supported the mistake instruction, recognizing that the jury could have parsed and
weighed the testimony of the witnesses in reaching a conclusion. People v. Mayberry, 542
P.2d 1337, 1346 (Cal. 1975). Ajury might, for example, have concluded that the complain-
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The function of the jury in a criminal case has traditionally been
expansively defined, with courts at both the trial and appellate levels
recognizing, as a corollary to the axiom that credibility is in the exclusive province of the jury, that ajury may "pick and choose" aspects of a
witness's testimony to credit or reject, 5 1 and may consider testimony
not merely as a historical record of what actually occurred, but also as
a lens through which to view other evidence in a case. The rule of
equivocality announced in Williams precludes such sifting by a jury,
instead imposing upon the finders of fact a bipolar model of acceptance or rejection of a witness's entire testimony. 152 This is a radical
departure from the norm.
Instead of the bipolar model contemplated by the court, there
are more properly three possibilities for a not guilty verdict, illustrated
by the figure below:

REASONABLE BELIEF
UNREASONABLE BELIEF

CONSENT

NO CONSENT

Not Guilty (1)
Not Guilty (2)

Not Guilty (3)
Guilty

The degree of force to which a complainant testifies need not
eliminate the third possibility, since ajury might not credit that portion of a complainant's testimony that described the use of force,
ant's testimony as to the degree of force used by defendant was "true" and therefore belied
the defendant's testimony on that issue; conversely, it could have found that the complainant was not "truthful" in describing the force used, but could nevertheless have found that
she did not consent to the sexual conduct, thus giving rise to a valid defense of reasonable
mistake.
151 Judge Posner appears to accept this proposition when he notes in Tyson v. Trigg that
"[o]f course the jury might have believed neither [Tyson or the complainant] completely
.... " 50 F.3d 436, 448 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 697 (1996). He does not,
however, implement this observation in his analysis. See also United States v. Morissette,
342 U.S. 246, 276 (1952) ("juries are not bound by what seems inescapable logic to
judges"); United States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022, 1025 (1st Cir. 1979) (jury is free to "pick
and choose"); Brooke v. United States, 385 F.2d 279, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1967); State v. Hightower, 312 S.E.2d 610, 614 (Ga. 1984).
152 The Wdliams court seemed to acknowledge, at least theoretically, this aspect of the
jury function when it held, at the conclusion of its opinion regarding the requirement that
a mistake instruction be given even when the equivocal evidence of consent comes after
the defendant has -used force against the complainaint, that:
a trier of fact is permitted to credit some portions of a wimess's testimony, and not
credit others. Since a trial judge cannot predict which evidence the jury will find
credible, he or she must give the Maybeny instruction whenever there is substantial
evidence of equivocal conduct that could be reasonably and in good faith relied on to
form a mistaken belief of consent, despite the alleged temporal context in which that
equivocal conduct occurred.
People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 968 (Cal. 1992). It is impossible to determine why the
court could be so skeptical as to the temporal, but not as to the substantive, evidence of
force and consent.
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although crediting her ultimate assertion that she did not consent. 153
Conversely, ajury might reject that portion of a defendant's testimony
that suggests positive enthusiasm by the complainant, concluding instead that the complainant exhibited only that amount of passive acquiescence sufficient to permit the defendant to form a good faith
and reasonable belief as to consent. 54 The court's unwillingness to
recognize this range of jury responses to witness testimony is fundamentally inconsistent with generally applicable principles regarding
credibility and the jury's function.1 55
The suggestion that testimony should be accepted or rejected in
its entirety also ignores the growing body of contemporary scholarship
that denies the singularity of meaning or experience, 156 and that rec153 This possibility is particularly strong where, for example, the degree of force to
which a complainant testifies is extreme, but is not corroborated by medical evidence. See,
e.g., State v. Tyson, 619 N.E.2d at 296 (complainant testified that defendant, a heavyweight
boxer, "slammed" her down, although the state offered no evidence of any corresponding
bruising or laceration).
The Tyson case illustrates the possibility of an intermediate "truth" between that described by either the complainant or defendant. There, a jury might well have found (if
permitted to consider the question) that the complainant did not consent to engage in
sexual intercourse, but instead found herself alone with an extraordinarily powerful man,
and that she submitted out of fear without expressinig her lack of consent, even if that fear
were not the result of any word or deed of the defendant His mere status as a heavyweight
boxer might well have caused the complainant to remain silent about her non-consent.
154 The NewJersey case of State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992), might require
more than this, but no other state does. See infra note 183.
Significantly, Judge Posner implies throughout his analysis of the mistake issue that
the relevant standard is one of express consent, rather than non-consent. Tyson v. Trigg,
50 F.3d at 448 ("If [the complainant] was believed, there had been no manifestation of
consent"); id. ("The question is then whether [the jury could have found that] ... Tyson
could reasonably have misunderstood her words or behavior as expressing consent"); id.
("But to take the next step, and believe that she manifested consent to him, would require
some testimony concerning events in the suite, testimony on which the jury might have
hung its judgmental cap"); id. at 448-449 (noting the "lack of any hint in [the complainant's] testimony of words or acts by which she might have manifested consent"). This
subtle error shapes the court's analysis of the mistake issue, allowing it to reject as "irrelevant" evidence of conduct preceding the sexual intercourse from which a reasonable person could have formed a belief as to consent. Id. at 448. See infra notes 179-180 and
accompanying text.
155 Judge Posner goes so far as to characterize as "sheer speculation" the possibility that
ajury might "[attempt] a reconstruction of the preliminaries to the rape that would have
established the defense of reasonable mistake." Tyson, 50 F.3d at 449.
156 The writings of postmodernist scholars challenge the notion, implicit in Williams and
similar decisions, that there is a single "true" account of what took place. See, e.g., Peter G.
Schanck, UnderstandingPostmodem Thought and Its Implicationsfor Statutory Interpretation, 65
S. CAL. L. REv. 2505 (1992), cited inJane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The ChangingStructure
ofLegitimay in Statutory Interpretation,108 HARv. L. REv. 593, 602 n.38 (noting that the "two
major strains" of postmodernism, "poststructuralists" and "neopragmatists," both express
the idea that our perspectives on the world are culturally and linguistically conditioned,
that reality is never transparent to us, and that the content of our knowledge depends on
our different situations.")
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ognizes and even celebrates differences in perception that flow from
differences in gender, race, and culture.' 5 7 In a rape trial, these difference arise twice: first, in the perceptions of the participants themselves (complainant and defendant), and, second, in the perceptions
of individual jurors.15 8 Accordingly, the possibility of fragmentation
of a witness's testimony and of rejection or credit of some testimony,
but not all, is quite high. The perceptions of the participants may be
impossible to "harmonize," although both may be "true" in this more
limited sense. In addition, the response of differentjurors to that testimony may range along a wide continuum from. wholesale adoption
or rejection to a more nuanced and selective response inconceivable
to the Williams court. For these additional reasons, the rule of equivocality is flawed.

157 PATRiCiA J. WILMs, THE ALCHEMy OF RAGE AND RIGH-TS 149 (1991) (noting that

individuals' "experiences of the same circumstances may be very different"); Daniel Farber
& Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School An Essay on Legal Narratives,45 STAN. L. REv.
807, 810 (1993) (explaining different voice thesis which "postulates that members of different groups have different methods of understanding their experiences and communicating their understandings to others"); Id. at 811, n.18 (noting that "one scholar has gone so
far as to suggest that women have different perceptions of time, space, and causality"),
citingAnn C. Scales, Feminists in the Field of Time, 42 FLA. L. REv. 95, 122-123 (1990); CAROL
GiLLiGAN, IN A DrFraFrT VoicE 30 (1982) (contrasting a male model of conflict resolution,
defined by individual rights and rules, competition, and struggle, with a femal model defined by context, relationship, communication, and empathy). See also Naomi R. Cahn,
Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEo. L.J. 2475 (1993) ("we cannot overlook the possibility that outsiders' stories may conflict, and that the narratives of excluded groups may be inconsistent,") citing, inter alia, Charles R. Lawrence I, The Word and the River. Pedagogy as
Scholarship StruggI 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2231, 2270-77 (1992); MariJ. Matsuda, Wen the First
Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness asJurisprudentialMethod, 11 WOMEN'S Rrs. L REP. 7, 8
(1989). Whether such differences are rooted in gender, race, or other variables is not as
significant as the simple fact that these differences indeed exist.
One can imagine how these differences might play out in a "date rape" scenario: according to Gilligan's models, the male actor might assume consent in the absence of a
clearly expressed "no," while the female actor might assume that the man, as a moral person, "considers, as would she, the consequences to everybody involved" before acting. GiLLrGAN, supra at 54. Again according to Gilligan's models, the woman might believe "that
her voice will be heard" and that the male actor is as empathetic as she. Id. at 29. See also
Karen M. Kramer, Rule By Myth: The Social and Legal Dynamics GoverningAlcohol-Related AcquaintanceRapes, 47 STAN. L. Rxv. 115, 118 (1995) (noting that "[glender sterotypes exert a
powerful effect on the social interpretation of a woman's 'no'"), citingAlejandro Martinez,
Suzanne O'Brien & David Frazee, Final Report of Rape Education Project Survey. Stanford
Survey on Attitudes, Awareness, and Experience of Sexual Violence 14-15 (unpublished
study, on file with the Stanford Law Review) (finding that both men and women rated a
"no" from others as less meaningful than their own, with women responding that they
meant no when they said "no," but that other women often do not).
158 See Cahn, supra note 15, at 2476-77 ("[A]t least three different stories could be told
about the 'facts' at every [civil] trial. ... The defendant generally tells a different story
than the plaintiff, and the judge orjury may find that an entirely different story constitutes
the 'truth' in the case.").
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IN RAPE

The rule of equivocality announced in Williams is one of several
recent doctrinal developments in the area of rape law that has reconfigured well settled rules of criminal law to have unique application to
sexual offenses.' 5 9 Not only are these doctrinal developments departures from generally applicable principles of criminal law, but they
exist in neat symmetry with now repudiated rules of rape law that had,
prior to the period of legislative and judicial reform, impeded rape
prosecutions. 16 0 In this respect, doctrinal developments have come
full circle, reinstating flawed logic and unsound reasoning to facilitate, rather than impede, some prosecutions for sexual offenses.
The rule of equivocality is, in effect, the obverse of the antiquated
corroboration requirement. That rule was a judicially created categorical barrier to jury consideration of certain evidence. It operated
to the detriment of the prosecution by foreclosing ajury from convicting on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of a complainant,
even where the jury might have credited her.' 6 1 The equivocality rule
operates as a similarly categorical obstruction ofjury consideration of
a body of evidence, this time to the detriment of the defendant, requiring that his testimony regarding his belief as to consent be "corroborated" by the character of the consent evidence. Unless a court
finds, as a threshhold matter, that the evidence with respect to consent is "equivocal," ajury will be foreclosed from considering evidence
that the defendant honestly and reasonably believed that there was
consent, even if that jury would have credited such evidence. As with
159 For example, as illustrated above, the notion of equivocality has no application to
any other offense to which the defense of mistake of fact has long been available.
160 In her work, Real Rape, Susan Estrich identified a set of legal rules that at the time of
her writing made prosecuting rape extremely difficult. These rules applied only to rape
and included the requirement that a complainant's testimony be corroborated; the requirement that the complainant resist to her utmost; the broad-ranging inquiry into a complainant's sexual past; the substantiality of the force requriement; the requirement that
that a complaint be "fresh"; and the cautionary instruction that rape is a charge easy to
make and difficult to refute. SusAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 3-5 (1983). See alsoVivian Berger,
Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation:Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. RPy. 1, 10 (1977)
(identifying a similar list of legal obstacles to rape prosecutions).
161 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN.§ 22.2801 (1981) (requiring corroboration of complainant's
testimony) (abolished for adult female complainants in Arnold v. United States, 358 A.2d
335 (D.C. 1976)); State v. Rhodes, 270 N.W.2d 920 (Neb. 1978) (continuing to require
corroboration for adult complainaints); People v. Radunovic, 234 N.E.2d 212 (1967) (requiring corroboration of complainant' testimony as to each and every material fact essential to constitute the crime) (repealed by NewYork Penal Law § 130.16 (McKinney 1975)).
See generallyVitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule RegardingNecessity for Corroboration of Victim's Testimony in Prosecutionfor Sexual Offense 31 A.LR. 4th 120. See also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) ("No person shall be convicted of any [sexual offense felony] upon
the uncorroberated testimony of the alleged victim.").
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the corroboration requirement, the rule looks not to the disputed evidence itself but to other evidence in order to determine as a matter of
law whether the disputed evidence can reach the jury.
This judicial obstruction is no less improper than was the corroboration requirement and for precisely the same reasons. The corroboration requirement validated the view that a rape victim's testimony
was less reliable than other forms of evidence, as well as less reliable
than the testimony of victims of all other crimes. The requirement
was ultimately rejected by nearly every state that had applied it, once it
had been demonstrated that the rule was rooted not in legitimate concerns about protecting defendants from unjust conviction, 162 but instead in "a deep distrust of the female accuser." 163 Similarly, the rule
of equivocality, in its creation of a categorical bar to consideration of a
defendant's testimony in support of a defense of mistake, validates the
view that a rape defendant's testimony is less reliable than that of
other witnesses, and, more significantly, "privileges" the testimony of
the complainant in rape cases. 164
This inversion can be seen in at least one other area: the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct. Despite a well established
evidentiary taboo against the use of propensity evidence to prove a
defendant's character, with certain exceptions 165 in the area of sexual
162 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2061 (Chadbourne rev. 1978) (observing that the corrobora-

tion requirement was "based plausibly on the laudable purpose of protecting against false
accusations").
163 Berger, supra, note 160, at 10. AsJudge Skelly Wright noted in United States v. Sheppard, "it was said that because charges of rape may easily be fabricated, and because juries
may be enraged by testimony of sexual assaults, and because a defense to a rape charge is
difficult to establish, a corroboration rule is necessary in all
such cases to protect defendants against unjust convictions. More recent studies, however, suggest that the factors invoked in support of the corroboration requirement do not justify that rule . . . juries
generally tend to view rape charges with suspicion; and convictions in the absence of aggravating circumstances are extremely rare." United States v. Sheppard, 569 F.2d 114 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (citations omitted) (repealing the corroboration requirement in the District of
Columbia).
For discussion of the corroboration requirement and advocacy of its repeal, see Susan
Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1136-1137 nn.150-60 (1986); Note, Recent Statutoy Developments in the Definition of ForcibleRape, 61 VA. L.Rrv. 1500, 1529-33 (19.75); Note, The Rape
CorroborationRequirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L. J. 1365 (1972); Note, Corroborating
Charges of Rap 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1137 (1967).
164 FLETCHER, supra note 99, at 130-31.
165 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 413; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101. See also EdwardJ. Imwinkelried &
Miguel A. Mendez, ResurrectingCalifornia'sOld Law on CharacterEvidence,23 PAC. LJ.1005,
1006, 1041 (1992) (noting that the rule precluding evidence of uncharged conduct to
prove character was "part of the early law of England" and is curently in force in "all American jurisdictions, either by statute or case law .... "). But see CA. EvrD. CODE § 1101(b)
(exception permitting such evidence when offered to prove "whether a defendant in a
prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably
and in good faith believe that the victim consented") (amended by Stats. 1986, ch. 1432,
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offenses, many states have created strained justifications for admitting
evidence of prior sexual assaults, permitting such evidence to be considered on the issue of mistake as to consent and, in some instances,
even actual consent. 166 Most recently, the Federal Rules of Evidence
have been amended to permit broad use of evidence of prior sexual
assaults and not other offenses "on any matter to which it is
67
relevant."1
This recent development has as its obverse the now repudiated
practice of permitting evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct to prove consent. While that practice has been thoroughly reformed by the enactment of rape-shield laws, which prohibit
exploration of a complainant's prior sexual history except in limited
circumstances, 68 the exploration of defendants' sexual past is now a
viable tactic for proving non-consent.
Again, the rationale for halting the practice of impeaching a complainant's testimony as to consent by use of her prior sexual history is
applicable, with nearly equal force, to the admission of prior bad acts
against a rape defendant. 69 In either instance, the notion that an
§§ 1,2, pp. 5129-5130).
166 See, e.g., People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380 (Cal. 1994) (admissible to prove common
design or plan) (overruling People v. Tassell, 679 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1984)); People v. Jackson,
110 Cal. App. 3d 560 (Cal. Ct. Appeals 1980) (defendant's assertion of consent "was tantamount to a denial that he intended [to perform the sexual conduct] by force or intimidation. Evidence of prior offenses was thus admissible to establish defendant's intent in the
present offense by corroborating the victim's testimony that she had not consented to the
sex acts"); State v. Lough, 853 P.2d 920 (Wash. Ct App. 1993) (admitting evidence to prove
common scheme or plan, as well as "knowledge" of victim's lack of capacity to consent by
reason of physical helplessness); People v. Oliphant, 250 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 1976) (admitting evidence to show common scheme or plan and to prove actual consent); Velez v.
State, 762 P.2d 1297, 1302 n.8 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (collects cases); People v. McKibben,
862 P.2d 991 (Colo. App. 1993) (admitting evidence to prove lack of consent); State v.
Lamoureaux, 623 A.2d 9 (R-i. 1993) (admitting evidence as proof of absence of mistake to
prove lack of consent).
167 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, P.L. 103-322; 108 Stat.
1796 § 320935 (1994) (enacted Sept. 13, 1994) (amending the FEDERAL RuLEs OF EvIDENCE
to add Rules 413, 414, and 415). See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., 1 FEDERAL RuLES OF
EvIDENCE MANUAL 575, 580, 583 (6th ed. 1994).
168 See, e.g., FED. R. EVD. 412.

169 The symmetry between so-called rape-shield laws and prior bad acts evidence is admittedly an imperfect one. See Susan Estrich, TeachingRape Law, 102 YALE L. Rv. 509, 519
(1992) (characterizing it as a "false symmetry") ("[Elvidence that a man has abused other
women is much more probative of rape than evidence that a woman has had consensual
sex with other men is probative of consent."). Professor Estrich's explanation, however,
does not demonstrate that a defendant's uncharged misconduct is in fact more probative
than the prior sexual conduct of a complainant on the consent issue, so much as it suggests
that such evidence poses a graver risk of being perceived as probative by a finder of fact:
Most women have had sexual experiences, and unless those experiences fall into some
kind of unusual pattern, the mere fact that a woman has had lovers tells us almost
nothing about whether she consented on the particular occasion that she is charging
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individual's conduct respecting consent on a prior occasion provides a
valid indicator of that person's consent on a subsequent occasion170
and with a different partner-is simply wrong.
as rape. But won't we all look at a defendant differently if three other women have
also come forward to say they were abused? The danger with such evidence is not that
it proves so little, but that it may prove too much.
Id.
Another commentator has argued against this purported symmetry, contending, inter
alia, that rape shield laws encourage reporting of rapes, whereas "revealing... evidence
[of a defendant's uncharged conduct] would not suppress conduct that society wants to
promote." Roger C. Park, The Cime Bill of 1994 and the Law of CharacterEvidence: Congress
Was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22 FoRD. URB. L. J. 271, 277 (1995). Profesor Park
contends that evidence of a complainant's prior sexual history is less probative than that of
a defendant, arguing that prior consent "tends ... to show that [the complainant] does not
readily make accusations of rape. Otherwise, why didn't she accuse one of her many partners of rape?" Id. at 278. This analysis purports to link an individual's propensity to fabricate a charge of rape to her prior sexual history, with no support for so doing. Professor
Park goes on to argue that "[t]he defendant's history of other rapes does not cut both
ways. It simply tends to show that the defendant is a rapist who is more likely to be guilty in
this case without the evidence." I&L This argument ignores the now widely accepted view
that rape is a crime of violence rather than a purely sexual crime. Even a defendant convicted of sexual assault is likely nevertheless to subsequently engage in consensual sex.
Moreoever, the analysis presumes that consent was at issue in the prior uncharged assault,
when in may instances the issue for trial is one, like identity, that has no probative value on
the matter of consent.
At least two courts to date have noted this symmetry between rape shield evidence and
evidence of uncharged misconduct. See People v. Oliphant, 250 N.W.2d 443, 459-464
(Mich. 1976) (Levin, J. dissenting); State v. Christensen, 414 N.W.2d 843 (Iowa Ct. App.
1987). In Christensen,the intermediate appellate court observed that "in an analagous situation," the Iowa Supreme Court held that "we have never adopted the principle that a
victim's consent to intercourse with one man implies her consent in the case of another
.... Neither, we think, does one woman's lack of consent to intercourse with a man imply
a different woman's lack of consent to intercourse with the same man." Christensen, 414
N.W.2d at 846-47 (citing Oliphant,250 N.W. 2d at 450). It further held that admissibility of
such evidence on the question of mistake would require an "additional necessary logical
thread connecting [the first victim's] alleged lack of consent, [defendant's] awareness of
that lack of consent-an issue about which [the first victim's testimony] has nothing to
say-and [the defendant's] awareness, mistaken or otherwise, of [the second victim's] lack
of consent." I& at 847. See also Statement of Myrna Raeder, On Behalf of the American
Bar Association, Before the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States, Comments on Rules 413, 414, and 415, Federal Rules of
Evidence 4-5 (Oct. 10, 1994) (noting a risk that, if propensity evidence is made admissible
in sexual assault cases, it "may ultimately produce a backlash against the strict intepretation
of the federal Rape Shield Rule 412 .... judges may claim that due process requires
investigation of the complainant's sexual history when the defendant's sexual history is
being offered for propensity and credibility is the key.").
170 See, e.g., Velez v. State, 762 P.2d 1297, 1301 n.6 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) ("[e]vidence
regarding a motive to have intercourse with one woman does not legitimately support an
inference that the defendant was motivated to have intercourse with a second woman")
(citing Plemikoffv. State, 719 P. 2d 1039, 1043 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986)); State v. Saltarelli,
655 P.2d 697, 699-701 (Wash. 1982); State v. Christensen, 414 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1987); People v. Oliphant, 250 N.W.2d 443, 450 (Mich. 1976) ("[c]ertainly, the fact
that an individual commits a rape at one time has no bearing on whether another woman
consented to intercourse at a later time") (admitting evidence of uncharged conduct on
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Significantly, those courts that have adopted a rule permitting the
admission of uncharged misconduct on the issue of mistake only, refusing such evidence when offered to prove actual non-consent, have
imputed a mistake defense to the defendant even when it had not
been offered by the defense, in order to apply the evidentiary rule and
admit the uncharged misconduct. In these instances, courts have construed evidence of actual consent offered by a defendant as evidence
of mistake, ignoring any concern about the unequivocal nature of that
evidence.1 7 ' This inconsistency further exposes the analytical weakness of the proposition that mistake and consent are inconsistent defenses, supported by evidence different in kind.
The symmetry between the emerging legal rules governing rape
prosecutions and those rules that were the subject of hard-fought
struggles for legal reform underscores the breadth of the change in
the legal landscape of this offense. In section VII below, I examine
some possible explanations for this change.
VII.

CONCLUSION: RHETORIC AND REASONABLENESS

It is difficult to explain the transformation of the rules of rape
described above. What animates courts to impose barriers to consideration of certain evidence, defense evidence this time, when they are
now constrained from imposing symmetrical barriers on prosecution
evidence? The answer, in part, can be found in the rhetoric of some
recent rape decisions. The discourse of these decisions evinces
profound judicial concern that jury consideration of certain kinds of
evidence in cases of sexual assault may produce troubling results. In
this respect, the rhetoric as well as the rules have come full circle from
the infamous Stanford Law Review article of 1966 which held that
other grounds);Jones v. State, 580 So.2d 97, 101 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) ("unless there is
some logical and reasonable connection or relation between the forcible rape of two different women, 'the fact that one woman was [forcibly] raped has no tendency to prove that
another woman did not consent to intercourse'"), quoting2 A.L.R.4th §6(b) at 378; State v.
Keys, 852 P.2d 621, 625 (Mont. 1993) (even if defendant intended to engage in sex forcibly
and without consent, "this criminal intent would be irrelevant if [the complainant] consented," and evidence of defendant's intent is therefore inadmissible).
171 See, e.g., People v. Tassell, 679 P.2d 1, 10-12 (Cal. 1984) (Reynoso,J., concurring and
dissenting) (although defendant asserted consent, and did not assert a Maybenry defense,
defendant placed his intent with respect to consent at issue, and the same evidence supported both actual consent and reasonable belief as to consent); State v. Lough, 853 P.2d
920, 935 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) ("even where a defendant does not specifically raise the
issue of intent or good faith, evidence of other offenses may be admissible as showing a
common scheme or plan"); State v. Lamoreaux, 623 A.2d 9, 13 (RI. 1993) ("[i]mplicit in a
defendant's claim that a victim of sexual assault consented to his advances is the claim that
at least he was led to believe that there was consent. Thus the issue of consent in this case
is closely related to the issue of mistake").
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"although a woman may desire sexual intercourse, it is customary for
her to say 'no, no, no' (although meaning 'yes, yes, yes') and to expect
the man to be the aggressor," or the 1952 Yale Law Journal article
which reported that "[m]any women ...require as a part of preliminary 'love play' aggressive overtures by the man" and that "[o]ften
their erotic pleasure may be enhanced by, or even depend upon, an
72
accompanying physical struggle.'
In Williams, for example, the court was plainly concerned that an
instruction on the defense of mistake of fact might have produced an
acquittal. The court commented that the defense evidence could not
be deemed proof of reasonable belief of consent without "reviv[ing]
the obsolete and repugnant idea that a woman loses her right to refuse sexual consent if she accompanies a man alone to a private
place." 173 In its zeal to distance itself from the assumptions of earlier
courts, and to demonstrate its contemporaneity in sexual matters, the
court characterizes as irrelevant evidence that might well have been
considered by some jurors on the issues of both consent and mistake,
such as the complainant's accompanying the defendant to a place
where he asked for and received a bedsheet in exchange for a payment of $20. The obvious absence of a television set inside the rented
room did not preclude the court from going on to comment that the
assumption about consent "is an especially cruel [one] here, where
the victim, a homeless woman, may well have wanted nothing more
than the relative quiet and comfort of a private room in which to relax
and watch television." 174
Similarly, in Tyson v. TDigg, Judge Posner ridicules defense evidence of conduct by the complainant in the hours and minutes before
the sexual encounter, from which a reasonable person might have
formed a belief as to consent, holding that, "[tihough it should be
obvious, we add that possible manifestations of consent before [the
complainant] entered the bedroom would not be enough evidence to
require that an instruction on reasonable mistake be given."' 75 He
172 EsTc:H, supra note 160, at 38-39 (quoting Roger B. Dworkin, The Resistance Standard
in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REv. 680 (1966) and Note, Forcible and Satutory Rape: An

Exploration of the Operationand Objectives of the Consent Standard,62 YALE L.J. 62 (1952). See
also Larry W. Myers, ReasonableMistake of Age: A Needed Defense to Statutory Rape, 64 Micn. I
Rxv. 105, 125 (1965) (contending that defendants charged with statutory rape are often
"innocent boys who may in fact have been enticed by the most seductive of young women"), quoting State v. Snow, 252 S.W. 629, 632 (Mo. 1923) ("[a] lecherous woman is a
social menace; she is more dangerous than T.N.T.; more deadly than the 'pestilence that
walketh in darkness or the destruction that wasteth at noonday'" (citation omitted)).
173 People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 967 (Cal. 1992) (quoting the dissenting opinion
below, in the Court of Appeals).
174 Id. at 967.
175 Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 448 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996).

ROSANNA CAVALLARO

[Vol. 86

draws an inapt analogy to a commercial contract:
The law of rape is not a part of the law of contracts. If on Friday you
manifest consent to have sex on Saturday, and on Saturday you change
your mind but the man forces you to have sex with him anyway, he cannot use your Friday expression to interpose, to a charge of rape, a deconsent. You are
fense of consent or of reasonable mistake as to 176
privileged to change your mind at the last moment.
In this dismissive analogy, Posner assumes the answers to two critical
questions. First, he assumes that the complainant "made her change
of mind clear to Tyson." 177 Of course, if she did not, then her conduct manifesting consent prior to the rape would be relevant to, and
would support, a defense of mistake as to consent. 178 Second, Judge
Posner recites that "[o]bviously the jury disbelieved [Tyson] when he
testified that the complainant had been not merely a willing but an
enthusiastic participant."1 79 Notwithstanding this rhetorical emphasis, there is no way of knowing what the jury believed about Tyson's
perception of the complainant as an enthusiastic participant, since the
mistake instruction was not given. All that can be determined with
certainty is that the jury found that she did not actually consent; but
this conclusion does not necessarily imply that she appearednot to consent, which is the relevant issue for mistake of fact.'8 0 As in Williams,
fearing that the jury might view the evidence just as the defendant
would wish, the court forces jurors to don a set of blinders. The depth
of these courts' apprehension provides powerful proof that the evidence is susceptible to the very construction they eschew.
This rhetoric parallels the shift in the doctrinal landscape deThis included evidence that the complainant "met Tyson later, under circumstances which
suggested an interest in sex - she accepted an invitation at 1:40 a.m., voluntarily accompanied Tyson to his hotel room, and willingly sat on his bed with him." Tyson v. State, 619
N.E.2d 276, 297 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
176 Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d at 448. Posner inserts an additional day into the analogy in
order to bolster his point, although the facts of the Tyson case are that the conduct alleged
to have permitted Tyson to form a belief as to consent immediately preceded and accompa-

nied the sexual conduct.
177 Id. at 448.
178 Id. at 448.
179 Moreover, conduct during sexual intercourse that was consistent with the prior conduct indicating consent-such as her request that Tyson use a condom, and her affirmative response when Tyson asked her if she would like to be "on top"-is also relevant to
Tyson's reasonable belief about consent, since it demonstrates that the prior consent had
not been withdrawn. Id.
180 Additional instances of appellate courts' grappling with the possibility that a jury's
view of the evidence might endorse sterotypes that the court disdains can be found in a
number of decisions on the matter of mistake. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simcock, 575
N.E.2d 1137, 1142 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) ("It is most unlikely, therefore, that the jury
found lack of consent based upon the unexpressed misgivings in the mind of the victim
that were inconsistent with her words and actions.").
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scribed above, a boomerang back from misgivings about juries who
might too easily convict to juries who might too readily acquit. The
test for an instruction is not, however, the possibility that the jury may
disappoint the court. Judges may not impose an obstacle between the
jury and the facts, even with the high-minded purpose of establishing
a standard below which ajury may not sink.
The limitation already embedded in the mistake defense-that
any mistake must not only be genuine but also reasonable-adequately protects the legitimate interest in educating sexual actors
about acceptable norms of behavior without subverting fundamental
principles of criminal law and procedure in the ways described above.
Under this existing limitation, ajury would be free to convict or acquit
either Mayberry or Williams, by determining the fact question within
their province: the reasonableness of the defendant's belief in consent. 18 1 In resolving this issue, juries would consider such factors as
the degree of force involved and, most importantly, the credibility of
the witnesses, and would not be bound by a court's characterization of
the sum of the evidence as "equivocal" or otherwise.
Courts and legislatures may indeed have the effect of prodding
juries in a particular direction, not by taking fact issues away from
them, but by giving content to the notion of reasonableness. A rule
stating that it is never reasonable to believe there was consent if the
complainant says "no,"18 2 or, more expansively, a rule that denies the
reasonableness of a belief if the complainant does not give her consent expressly 183 are two examples of such possibilities.
181 See People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 965 (Cal. 1992) (defendant's belief must not
only be held in good faith, but must also be formed "under circumstances that society will
tolerate as reasonable").
182 Commonwealth v. Lefkowitz, 481 N.E.2d 227, 232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (Brown,J.,
concurring) (rejecting purely subjective standard for mistake as to consent in rape) ("It is
time to put to rest the societal myth that when a man is about to engage in sexual intercourse with a 'nice' woman 'a little force is always necessary' ... I am prepared to say that
when a woman says 'no' to someone any implication other than a manifestation of nonconsent that might arise in that person's psyche is legally irrelevant, and thus no defense."). Professor Estrich has, for example, argued that while unreasonable mistakes
should never exculpate, reasonable mistakes should. In giving content to the term "reasonable," she adopts a standard of express non-consent, which might perhaps be viewed as
a midpoint on the continuum of possible standards. Es-rmcH supra note 160, at 97-98
("give [a woman] credit for knowing [her mind] herself when she speaks it, regardless of
their relationship") and 102 ("unreasonableness" as to consent is "understood to mean
ignoring a woman's words").
183 At least one state has adopted this more expansive definition: In the case of State ex.
rel. M.T.S., the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the physical force element of the
offense of rape could be satisfied "if the defendant applies any amount of force against
another person in the absence of what a reasonable person would believe to be affirmative and
freely-given permission to the act of sexual penetration." State ex. rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266,
1277 (N.J. 1992) (emphasis added). See also The Antioch College Sexual Offense Policy
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The requirement of a minimal threshold of evidence as a prerequisite for an instruction' 8 4 and the ample room for legislative and ju-

dicial rulemaking under the rubric of reasonableness adequately
protect against a mistake defense run rampant without the unworkable and illogical requirement of equivocality that has been grafted on
to the rule. In addition, of course, there is the not insubstantial hurdle of the jury. An instruction on mistake of fact is far from a required finding of not guilty; instead, the jury must credit at least some
aspects of a defendant's evidence in order to conclude that there was
indeed a reasonable and actual mistake as to consent. If the jury
shares the court's vision of what a man may reasonably believe when a
woman "accompanies [him] alone to a private place," 18 5 or when she
accepts an invitation after midnight, 8 6 they can and should be trusted
to convict, even if offered the possibility to acquit based upon reasonable belief in consent.

(requiring consent "for each new level of physical and/or sexual contact/conduct in any
given interaction," and defining "consent" as "the act of willingly and verbally agreeing to
engage in spcific sexual contact or conduct"). See also Ellen Goodman, The Struggle on
College Campuses to Create a New Standardof Sexual Equality, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 19, 1993, at
75; June Gross, CombatingRape on Campus in a Class on Sexual Consent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25,
1993, at 1.
Such rules would nevertheless require ajudge to instruct the jury on both actual and
reasonable belief in consent whenever there is a conflict in testimony, leaving the jury free
to find as fact that consent was or was not expressly given.
184 See supra note 61, 94 and accompanying text.
185 People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 967 (Cal. 1992).
186 Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276, 297 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).

